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INTRODUCTION
“You call what he doing okay? You call what he doing okay?”1 A bystander
uttered these haunting words as he witnessed a Minneapolis police officer kneel
on George Floyd’s neck for minutes until Floyd became unresponsive.2 Immediate protests erupted across the country, some violent.3 These protests address police brutality, police tactics, and systemic racism.4 One significant piece of that
ongoing conversation has been qualified immunity.5 A Google Trends analysis
shows that terms such as “qualified immunity” and “police brutality” have concomitantly risen with “George Floyd.”6 And the Google Trend peaks for both
“qualified immunity” and “police brutality” are higher than they have ever
been—a clear indicator that the public is engaged and concerned about this
topic.7
George Floyd’s death sparked renewed focus on qualified immunity8—a
doctrine that had already been well-criticized prior to Floyd’s death.9
1

Bystander, ‘Please, Please I Can’t Breathe’: Man Dies After Being Detained by Minneapolis Police, FBI Investigating, FOX 9 (May 27, 2020) (video courtesy of Darnella Frazier via
Storyful), https://www.fox7austin.com/news/please-please-i-cant-breathe-man-dies-after-being-detained-by-minneapolis-police-fbi-investigating [https://perma.cc/FB4N-22Y9].
2
Id.
3
Christine Hauser et al., ‘I Can’t Breathe’: 4 Minneapolis Officers Fired After Black Man
Dies in Custody, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/minneapolis-police-man-died.html [https://perma.cc/BM34-N9WS]. As I am writing, protesters
have set ablaze a police precinct not far from where George Floyd died. Dom Calicchio, Minneapolis Third Precinct Police Station Set on Fire After Rioters Break in, FOX NEWS (May 29,
2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/minneapolis-third-precinct-police-station-set-on-fire-after-rioters-break-in [https://perma.cc/7ZN8-FQUT].
4
Jamila Michener, George Floyd’s Killing Was Just the Spark. Here’s What Really Made the
Protests Explode., WASH. POST (June 11, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2020/06/11/george-floyds-killing-was-just-spark-heres-what-really-made-protestsexplode [https://perma.cc/EJN9-BJ5P].
5
Debra Cassens Weiss, Death of George Floyd Brings Debate on Qualified Immunity for
Police Misconduct, A.B.A. J. (June 2, 2020, 11:18 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/a
rticle/death-of-george-floyd-brings-debate-on-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/4DR3-T
83Y].
6
GOOGLE TRENDS, trends.google.com (search for “George Floyd,” “qualified immunity,” and
“policy brutality” respectively) (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
7
Id.
8
Weiss, supra note 5. George Floyd’s situation may be a poor vehicle for driving qualified
immunity reform because prominent cases such as this often result in large settlements. Lawrence Hurley & Andrea Januta, When Cops Kill, Redress Is Rare - Except in Famous Cases,
REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usapolice-immunity-outliers [https://perma.cc/Z6LQ-DUDD]. Courts could also find that the officers violated clearly established law as the Ninth Circuit did long ago in factually analogous
circumstances. E.g., Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding officers violated a person’s constitutional rights when they placed their weight on his
back and neck while the person repeatedly said he could not breathe and became permanently
vegetative).
9
Amir H. Ali & Emily Clark, Qualified Immunity: Explained, APPEAL (June 20, 2019), https:
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Commentators have already pointed fingers at the Supreme Court—the institution that created the doctrine—as the responsible party, claiming the doctrine
“facilitate[s] a law enforcement culture that tolerates extreme, even sadistic violence against civilians.”10
Qualified immunity is no stranger to criticism. Academics have criticized
the doctrine as both unlawful11 and ineffective.12 Media organizations have criticized the doctrine.13 A major think-tank has created an entire website dedicated
to abolishing qualified immunity.14 Public opinion data shows widespread support for abolishing qualified immunity.15
And these criticisms are bipartisan. Congressional Democrats and Republicans have signed on to a bill to abolish qualified immunity.16 Ideologically opposite media organizations have criticized the doctrine.17 Even traditionally

//theappeal.org/qualified-immunity-explained [https://perma.cc/RCE5-FF6X]; Jay Schweikert, Two Recent En Banc Decisions Exemplify the Injustice, Impracticality, and Persistent
Confusion Inherent to Qualified Immunity, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 22, 2019, 2:35
PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/two-recent-en-banc-decisions-exemplify-injustice-impracticality-persistent-confusion-inherent [https://perma.cc/U2J9-WB7E].
10
Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Broke Police Accountability. Now It Has the
Chance to Fix It, SLATE (May 27, 2020, 5:54 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/05/george-floyd-supreme-court-police-qualified-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/T
339-46B9]; C.J. Ciaramella, The Supreme Court Has a Chance to End Qualified Immunity
and Prevent Cases Like George Floyd’s, REASON (May 29, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://reason.com/2020/05/29/the-supreme-court-has-a-chance-to-end-qualified-immunity-and-prevent-cases-like-george-floyds [https://perma.cc/JFA5-MVUC]; Jay Schweikert, In the Wake
of George Floyd’s Death, All Eyes Turn to SCOTUS, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (May 30,
2020, 5:36 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/wake-george-floyds-death-all-eyes-turn-scotus
[https://perma.cc/L5J4-UZEW] (“Mr. Floyd was ‘the latest victim of our near-zero-accountability policy for law enforcement.’ ” (quoting colleague Clark Neily)). .
11
See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 46, 88 (2018)
(arguing that instead of reinforcing qualified immunity, the Court should be “beating a retreat”).
12
Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2017) (finding that
qualified immunity as a policy tool rarely does the job for which it is intended: ending civil
rights litigation against government officials).
13
Schweikert, supra note 10 (noting how ideological opposites—Fox News and the New
York Times—both agree on this topic).
14
UNLAWFUL SHIELD, https://www.unlawfulshield.com [https://perma.cc/HPT9-777X].
15
Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers for Misconduct, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 9, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/07/09/majority-of-public-favors-giving-civilians-the-power-to-sue-police-officers-for-misconduct
[https://perma.cc/T2VV-L3GW]; Emily Ekins, Poll: 63% of Americans Favor Eliminating
Qualified Immunity for Police, CATO INST. (July 16, 2020), https://www.cato.org/publications/survey-reports/poll-63-americans-favor-eliminating-qualified-immunity-police
[https://perma.cc/N8ZV-GSH6].
16
Eric Schnurer, Congress Is Going to Have to Repeal Qualified Immunity, THE ATLANTIC
(June 17, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/congress-going-have-repeal-qualified-immunity/613123 [https://perma.cc/DBD6-KV4X].
17
Schweikert, supra note 10.
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ideologically opposite Supreme Court justices—Justices Sotomayor and
Thomas—have criticized the doctrine.18
Yet even in a climate where abolishing qualified immunity has significant
support, the Supreme Court has doubled down on its creation. In its last term, the
Supreme Court had thirteen opportunities to address qualified immunity, some
of which asked the Court to abolish qualified immunity entirely.19 But the Court
declined to take up the qualified immunity question in any of the cases.20 And in
recent years, the Court has only shown a willingness to strengthen the doctrine,
not limit it.21
Lost in the midst of the appropriately sensational civil rights cases is the
costs of those civil rights cases. In all cases, qualified immunity is a defense for
state actors in their private capacity. But because governments almost always
indemnify their employees,22 the costs of civil rights litigation shift to the state,
and, by implication, the taxpayers who fund the state. Since § 1983 was enacted,
civil rights cases have increased dramatically.23
These costs are not insignificant.24 As civil rights cases increase, government
attorneys must spend more time addressing those cases and less time on other
valuable projects. Or governments must hire more staff to handle the increased
caseload, which requires less expenditures in another area or an increase in funding. Often, governments may choose to contract these cases out to other

18

Weiss, supra note 5.
Jay Schweikert, Supreme Court Will Soon Decide Whether to Reconsider Qualified Immunity, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Apr. 28, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/may15th-supreme-court-will-finally-decide-whether-hear-cases-calling-abolition-qualified [https:
//perma.cc/2M3P-HVPY].
20
Jordan S. Rubin, Justices Turn down Trio of Qualified Immunity Doctrine Cases (2),
BLOOMBERG L. (May 18, 2020, 2:29 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/justices-wont-hear-trio-of-cases-on-qualified-immunity-doctrine [https://perma.cc/NP8M-4TQ
M]; John Kruzel, Supreme Court Sidesteps New Cases on Gun Rights, Police Protections, THE
HILL (June 15, 2020, 9:45 AM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/502721-supremecourt-sidesteps-new-cases-on-gun-rights-police-protections [https://perma.cc/6V5H-UX2F]
(noting the court denied eight separate qualified immunity cases).
21
See Brent Kendall & Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Turns down Cases Challenging Immunity
Protections for Police, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2020, 5:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-turns-down-cases-challenging-immunity-protections-for-police-1159225
7204 [https://perma.cc/E2PB-FFNZ].
22
Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (noting
that officers between 2006 and 2011 only paid .02 percent of $730 million in civil suits because
the municipality usually indemnifies them).
23
Over Two Decades, Civil Rights Cases Rise 27 Percent, U.S. COURTS (June 9, 2014),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/06/09/over-two-decades-civil-rights-cases-rise-27-percent [https://perma.cc/UVZ6-3V2Q] (noting that the number of cases is fifty times the number
filed since 1964 and an increase of 27 percent in the last two decades).
24
As Justice Scalia puts it, “as civil-rights claims increase, the cost of civil-rights insurance
increases.” Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 419 n.3 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19
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attorneys,25 freeing up their own staff yet incurring significant additional costs.
Regardless, taxpayers must, in some way, bear these costs.
Of course, compensating worthy litigants is desirable. After all, injured parties deserve some redress. However, many civil rights litigants are not ultimately
successful,26 which adds costs to a government that need not have been borne.
This is perhaps why, at least in the prisoner civil rights context, Congress has
already enacted some statutory reform to reduce frivolous litigation,27 for example, which concomitantly reduces government costs.
Qualified immunity seeks to balance the benefit of compensating worthy litigants against the danger of imposing resource costs on government officials
when doing so could be deleterious to the public.28 In light of recent scholarship
criticizing the doctrine’s effectiveness in reaching its desired goals, however, it
is worth reexamining the doctrine and asking if there might be a better way to
balance these interests.
The goal of this Note is to provide that solution. Part I will provide a historical overview of qualified immunity. Part II will address some of qualified immunity’s most pernicious problems and present a congressional reform package
designed to cure those maladies. While this Note primarily addresses qualified
immunity and § 1983 in the context of executive branch officials because it affects them most,29 it is important to remember that qualified immunity affects all
government officials in various types of cases.30

25

See Kent J. Bullard, Filarsky v. Delia: An Unqualified Win for Qualified Immunity, W. CITY
(Dec. 1, 2012), https://www.westerncity.com/article/filarsky-v-delia-unqualified-win-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/3SAM-8SA4].
26
See Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 4, 11–12 (2015) (demonstrating that for constitutional torts, defendants prevail
far more often at trial than plaintiffs, and the number of terminations in federal district court
over time has increased). Cf. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CITIZEN
COMPLAINTS ABOUT POLICE USE OF FORCE 3 (2006) (noting that out of all complaints with a
disposition, only 8 percent of the complaints were sustained).
27
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559–60 (2003).
28
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–16 (1982).
29
Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 235 (2006).
30
The thirteen cases the Court could have chosen to hear, but did not, provide a good sampling
of the different types of cases qualified immunity touches. For example, Ermold v. Davis, 855
F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2017) dealt with Kim Davis, the county clerk who refused to issue a marriage license to a homosexual couple. Id. at 716–17. And Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457,
462 (5th Cir. 2019) dealt with a case where state investigators barged into an office and reviewed medical files without notice or warrant. Id. at 470. These cases serve as helpful reminders that not all § 1983 cases deal with police officers and excessive force; therefore, any
changes to qualified immunity should avoid narrowly looking at problems in the police context
and recognize the larger implications. As Shakespeare’s Friar Lawrence said, “Wisely and
slow. They stumble that run fast.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 3, l.
1129.

21 NEV. L.J. 835

840

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
I.

[Vol. 21:2

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Qualified immunity did not originate with Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 32
(1974)31 nor Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), as many scholars believe,
though those Supreme Court cases are important reference points.32 Instead,
qualified immunity really begins with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself. After all, no government official would need an affirmative defense without a statute permitting
liability in the first place. Consequently, understanding § 1983’s text, purpose,
legislative history, and social context will be helpful in examining just how far
qualified immunity should extend.
A. The Beginning: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Congress crafted § 1983 within a specific cultural context: post-Civil War
and mid-Reconstruction.33 Even though passing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments helped create a national vision of a more racially equal America,34
it came as no surprise that those amendments did not self-execute.35 Though constitutionally prohibited from denying individuals the “equal protection of the
laws,”36 states continued to enact laws intent on accomplishing that very purpose.37 These Jim Crow laws and Black Codes limited individual liberty and
freedoms.38 Beyond these institutionalized laws, the Ku Klux Klan used violence
and local government actors to enforce a vision contrary to the Second Founding.39 Because of this violence, President Ulysses S. Grant sent Congress a message imploring Congress to use its legislative power to provide additional protection for liberty and property.40
Thereafter, Congress introduced legislation to “enforce the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment [sic] to the Constitution of the United States” that, though
hotly debated, passed as the Civil Rights Act of 1871.41 Now codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the act provides, in pertinent part, that any person deprived “of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by
31

John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2012).
Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23
GA. L. REV. 597, 601–02 (1989).
33
Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a
Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517, 517–18 (1987).
34
Id. at 518.
35
But see Steven A. Engel, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of
Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 124–25
(1999) (arguing that the original intention of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment meant
the amendment to be self-executing).
36
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37
Mead, supra note 33, at 518.
38
PHILLIP S. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 51, 215 (1975).
39
Mead, supra note 33, at 518 n.6.
40
Id.
41
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244, at XXIII (1871)).
32
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any person acting “under [the] color of [state law]” can bring a private civil suit
for monetary damages.42 Even though § 1983’s language appears clear on its
face, courts have consistently struggled to apply it over time, constantly disagreeing over how to interpret the statute, the breadth of its scope, and to whom
it applies.43 These disagreements, contradictory rulings, and interpretations
muddy the water for courts seeking to interpret the statute today.44
That being said, at least one broad, central theme from § 1983 emerges from
judicial rulings: its idealistic purpose. As one court has stated, the “purpose of
Section 1983, according to its legislative history, is to redress violations of ‘human liberty and human rights’ committed by the States, state officials, or under
color of state law.”45 The Supreme Court has authoritatively declared:
Th[e] legislative history [of § 1983] makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with
respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state
instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might,
in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these
failings extended to the state courts. . . . The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people’s federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under
color of state law.46

Yet another justice has declared that § 1983 really effects a trifold purpose:
override some state laws, provide federal remedies when the state provides none,
and provide a federal remedy where the state remedy is practically inadequate.47
Regardless of the expression, § 1983’s overarching purpose is transparent;
Congress intended to prevent individual state actors from using their authority to
subvert constitutional rights in the racial context. And when state actors do violate constitutional rights, victims should be compensated and the actor punished.
That basic goal has remained clear. Yet the Supreme Court has struggled to interpret § 1983’s breadth, which means that at times its pronouncements have
strengthened § 1983’s power, such as the rulings that helped foster the Civil
Rights movement; but at other times, the Court has seemingly restricted its power
and reach.48
While the Supreme Court has exercised significant power in determining
§ 1983’s reach, Congress—§ 1983’s creator—has remained in the background
of this conversation, unwilling to touch or clarify the doctrine. Congress has the
power to amend § 1983 to its liking based on the policy concerns prevalent today
42

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Mead, supra note 33, at 519–20.
44
Id.
45
Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 226 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
46
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
47
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the “Background” of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5,
7 (1974) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1961)).
48
Mead, supra note 33, at 519–20 (discussing the various cases that have restricted § 1983’s
influence and cases, such as Monroe v. Pape, that have made § 1983 more available).
43
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but has chosen not to. If others see § 1983 today as failing its purpose, then, just
as President Grant called to action that Congress because of the then-perceived
societal ills, those who see § 1983’s failings should call upon Congress to amend
§ 1983 in a way that clarifies its scope and purpose for today. But when Congress
enacted § 1983, it chose a policy of favoring potential litigants. It has since stood
by that stance through inaction, witnessing the doctrine’s impact upon the
courts.49 With this clear purpose in mind, it begs the question: Why would the
Supreme Court articulate a doctrine that seemingly undercuts a clear congressional purpose?
B. Creating a Defense: The Many Faces of Qualified Immunity over the Years
While the Supreme Court did back away from a very restrictive reading of
§ 1983 and embrace an expansive reading,50 the Court has since then found ways
to mitigate those effects through creating (or adopting) a § 1983 defense and
constantly improving it.51 This defense—qualified immunity—has grown so
powerful that many call it an “obstacle” to civil rights claims52 and potentially
unconstitutional.53 The Supreme Court itself has recently declared that qualified
immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent.’ ”54
Importantly, when Congress adopted § 1983, it included no explicit provision creating such a defense,55 nor does the legislative history infer a defense
would exist.56 In fact, a plain reading of the statute’s broad, sweeping language
could be seen as evidence that such a defense should not exist at all.57 Yet it does,
much to the chagrin of civil rights scholars.58
Because of its controversial nature and the enormous amounts of civil rights
litigation today, qualified immunity is constantly litigated, or, at the least, in the

49

See Eric H. Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983
Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 595 (1985) (noting that Monroe v. Pape unleashed the “floodgates of litigation”).
50
Mead, supra note 33, at 520.
51
Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 126 (1985) (noting that
the Supreme Court adopted a new objective standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald).
52
Rob Yale, Note, Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1841, 1850 (1997).
53
George Leef, Qualified Immunity -- A Rootless Doctrine the Court Should Jettison, FORBES
(Mar. 21, 2018, 9:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2018/03/21/qualified-immunity-a-rootless-doctrine-the-court-should-jettison [https://perma.cc/J2FE-E5XU].
54
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308
(2015)).
55
David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 36 (1989).
56
Id. at 30.
57
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
58
See Baude, supra note 11.
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background of the litigation.59 “Just like its muddied approach to interpreting
§ 1983, the Supreme Court has adopted various standards and interpretive methods over time that have yielded conflicting views about the nature and scope of
the doctrine of qualified immunity.”60 It is likely that these competing visions
depend upon the specific cultural context in which they are spawned but also
reflect each justice’s views about the proper scope of § 1983 itself and the degree
to which individual state actors should be liable within the course of their duties.
Recently, the Court has embraced qualified immunity as a potent defense
that aggressively sifts out potential litigants.61 Indeed, one author views these
changes to the doctrine as a process whereby the Supreme Court seeks to (a)
transform qualified immunity into an absolute immunity and (b) shift the factfinding power from the jury to the judge.62 However, the Court has not always
embraced such an expansive vision. Over time, the Court has adopted various
standards that embrace different notions of qualified immunity’s purpose, and
without fail, each of these standards has generated considerable controversy. And
each standard has been announced and practiced without any explicit congressional endorsement.
Evaluating each of the Court’s various standards helps explain the Court’s
consistent policy justifications, and it helps reaffirm that this policy is malleable
and can and should be tweaked to better serve its real policy goals. The foregoing
Section hopes to illustrate just a few of the monumental cases that have shaped
the Court’s jurisprudence on qualified immunity.
1. Pierson v. Ray
In Pierson v. Ray, white and black clergymen attempted to promote racial
integration through a “prayer pilgrimage” by trying to use a segregated bus terminal waiting room.63 Mississippi code at the time made it a misdemeanor to
congregate with others in public so as to breach the peace and then refuse to
move when so ordered by police.64 Municipal police officers arrested the clergymen under this ordinance, and a municipal police justice convicted them.65 The
clergymen then brought a suit against the officers and police justice in federal
court for violating federal rights pursuant to § 1983.66

59

Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34
CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003 (2002) (finding an “explosion” of civil rights legislation is due to
Monroe v. Pape).
60
Schweikert, supra note 9.
61
See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (noting that qualified immunity protects “all
but the plainly incompetent” (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015))).
62
Chen, supra note 29, at 231–33.
63
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 549, 552 (1967).
64
Id.at 549.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 550.
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In the district court, the clergymen lost. But on appeal, the court of appeals
held the police officers liable under § 1983 because the Mississippi law the officers used to arrest the clergyman had been declared unconstitutional.67 For the
parallel state claim, however, the court of appeals found that the common law
shielded officers from liability so long as they had “probable cause to believe the
statute has been violated because Mississippi law does not require police officers
to predict at their peril which state laws are constitutional and which are not.”68
The Supreme Court eventually took the case to resolve whether the police
officers could assert a “good faith and probable cause” defense to an action arising under § 1983.69 Relying on traditional defenses to tort law, the Supreme
Court ruled that since police officers are generally not liable under tort law for
false arrest when they arrest someone who is later proven innocent, they should
not be liable for enforcing an unconstitutional statute—facially or as applied—if
they “reasonably believed” the statute was valid.70 The Court reaffirmed earlier
precedent, stating that § 1983 “ ‘should be read against the background of tort
liability’ . . . . Part of [that] background . . . is the defense of good faith and probable cause.”71
Pierson’s legacy, in effect, imports state common-law defenses and common-law notions of sovereign immunity into § 1983 litigation and interpretation.72 As the Court noted, the official standard for this “limited” immunity for
police officers was “good faith and probable cause.”73 However, in dicta, the
Court used a few phrases that would hang around for decades to come and foreshadow the eventual shift in the qualified immunity standard. Indeed, in a hypothetical, the Court remarked that not only must the standard be a “good faith”
standard, but the officers must “reasonably believe[]” the statute was constitutional.74 Furthermore, the Court made one sentiment that, to some degree, sums
up the common sentiment used to justify qualified immunity today: “We agree
that a police officer is not charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law.”75 In other words, police officers are entitled to judgment deference
when the law is not particularly clear.
In his dissent, Justice William O. Douglas criticized the nature of this immunity as well as its rationale. While he mainly criticized the Court’s holding in
granting unqualified immunity to the police justice, Justice Douglas’s rationale
stands as poignant criticism of the doctrine generally.76 First, he argued that the
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 551–52.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556–57 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1967)).
See id. at 557.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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very idea of these “exception[s]”—whether legislative, judicial, or executive—
undermines the core of § 1983.77 Second, he argued that the question of immunity is nothing more than a statutory interpretation issue, and Congress made clear
that “every person” under § 1983 meant every person acting under color of state
law.78
Third, while the majority focused on statutory interpretation with a background in tort law,79 Justice Douglas argued that the interpretative background
should instead be the historical civil rights violations which prompted § 1983 in
the first place.80 Indeed, § 1983 is a remedial measure; relying on common law
to interpret this statute in a way that weakens its remedial power just does not
make sense.81 Finally, and perhaps most imperatively, Justice Douglas attacked
one of qualified immunity supporters’ major policy positions: “The argument
that the actions of public officials must not be subjected to judicial scrutiny because to do so would have an inhibiting effect on their work, is but a more sophisticated manner of saying ‘The King can do no wrong.’ ”82 Justice Douglas
thought the likelihood that these notions of suit would actually interfere with
another’s work was at best minimal.83
2. Harlow v. Fitzgerald
The more modern conception of the qualified immunity standard, however,
begins with Harlow v. Fitzgerald.84 In Harlow, the petitioner contended that two
of President Richard Nixon’s senior aides engaged in a conspiracy to violate his
constitutional and statutory rights and that they completed this conspiracy when
they ultimately fired him from his position.85 In pre-trial litigation, the aides
made several immunity arguments: (1) they were entitled to absolute immunity
as an “incident of their offices as Presidential aides,”86 (2) “derivative” immunity,87 (3) a “special functions” immunity,88 and (4) qualified immunity.89 While
the Court summarily dismissed most of the immunity arguments,90 the Court

77

Id.
Id. at 559, 565.
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Id. at 556–57 (majority opinion).
80
Id. at 560 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81
Id. at 561.
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Id. at 565.
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Id. 565–66.
84
Michael M. Rosen, Comment, A Qualified Defense: In Support of the Doctrine of Qualified
Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, with Some Suggestions for Its Improvement, 35 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 139, 142 (2005).
85
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802–03 (1982).
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Id. at 808–09.
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Id. at 810.
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Id. at 811–12.
89
Id. at 813.
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Id. at 808–13.
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focused its inquiry on qualified immunity, reviewing its flaws and then providing
an “adjustment” to the standard to fix those perceived problems.91
First, the Court reiterated that executive officials may qualify for two types
of immunity—absolute and qualified—but that most executive officials qualify
only for qualified immunity.92 Second, the Court repeated prior justifications for
qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields officers from “disabling threats
of liability” and “undue interference” with the public officer’s duties.93 Presumably, protecting against “undue interference” meant encouraging executive officials who must “exercise their discretion” to “vigorous[ly] exercise . . . official
authority” by eliminating barriers that would discourage prompt execution: the
public ire.94 Additionally, the Court emphasized that qualified immunity protects
society from collective costs.95 This purpose recognized that “the people” pay
completely for government services; therefore, “social costs”—litigation expenses, diverted resources and energy for more pressing matters, and deterring
others from becoming a public official—harm the collective.96 Balancing the
need for compensating innocent victims and deterring unlawful state conduct
against the need to shield the collective from disabling legislation and encourage
vigilant execution of laws forms qualified immunity’s primary purpose.
Third, the Court recognized an important problem in its prior analysis and
subsequently changed the qualified immunity analysis in a way that still affects
the analysis today. Prior to Harlow, the Court analyzed qualified immunity as a
good faith affirmative defense.97 This “good faith immunity,” however, required
both an objective and subjective component.98 While the objective component
imposed a “presumptive knowledge” of “basic, unquestioned constitutional
rights,” the subjective component focused on whether the defendant official
“knew or reasonably should have known” that he was violating those rights.99
Naturally, while the objective component could be assessed by looking to the
outward legal landscape, the subjective component required detailed analysis of
the mind of the official.100
The crux of the issue for the Court was that its prior standard ran afoul of
two ideas: (1) that insubstantial claims should not go to trial, but (2) the federal
rules all but prohibited dismissing qualified immunity claims early on because
the subjective element required fact-sensitive inquiries, and those fact-sensitive
inquiries likely cannot be dismissed even at the motion for summary judgment
91

See id. at 813–15.
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stage.101 The end product of this regime resulted in defendants being subjected
to broad and probing discovery that could potentially disrupt efficient governance.102
To fix this problem, the Court issued the modern (mostly) standard for qualified immunity. Defendant officials qualify for qualified immunity when “their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”103 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that courts could, at the summary judgment stage, determine both currently available law as well as clearly established law at the time the conduct
occurred.104 The Court reasoned that this process could be done through solely
objective factors, so no extensive discovery would be necessary.105
Interestingly, not one of the Harlow justices seriously dissented. Three of
the concurring justices agreed whole-heartedly with the Court’s newly announced substantive standard.106 Four justices joined a concurring opinion that
also agreed with the Court’s standard but disagreed with Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
decided the same day.107 Justice Warren E. Burger’s lone dissent only criticized
the Court for not going far enough, arguing that the Court should have granted
the aides absolute derivative immunity.108 Thus, as a whole, the Court recognized
two things: qualified immunity should exist, and the Court’s newly announced
fix represented a good balance between the two different competing interests
discussed in the majority opinion.
3. Post-Harlow Case Law
Post-Harlow, but pre-2015, the Court made a few adjustments to the qualified immunity standard that are worth discussing briefly. In 1987, the Court addressed the “clearly established law” aspect of qualified immunity.109 In Anderson v. Creighton, an FBI agent sought qualified immunity for a warrantless
search of a home he believed a bank robber had used to hide.110 When sued, the
agent asserted qualified immunity, but the Eighth Circuit rejected his summary
judgment motion on qualified immunity because the right to be secure in one’s
home from warrantless searches absent some exception was clearly established.111
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Id. at 815–16.
Id. at 817–18.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 820–21 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 821–22 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 822 (Burger, J., dissenting).
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 638.
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The Supreme Court then tweaked the qualified immunity standard in an important way. It recognized that “clearly established law” should not be analyzed
generally, but more specifically.112 The Court acknowledged that this approach
implied a fact-specific inquiry but maintained that this still required legal objectivity.113 In other words, comprehending clearly established law requires understanding the objective legal landscape and applying it to the facts of the case as
the officer confronted them.114 Thus, in Anderson, the ultimate question was
whether the “contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”115 While defining law so specifically does not necessarily guarantee protection, “in the light of
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”116
Interestingly, whereas the Harlow standard received virtual unanimity, three
justices sharply dissented from the Anderson addition even though two of them
had agreed whole-heartedly with the Harlow standard.117 The Anderson dissent
focused on two important reasons for disagreeing with the majority. First, the
dissent argued that the majority viewed Harlow as creating an “extraordinary
circumstances” exception whereby an officer would be immunized when he
could not have known the legal standard even though clearly established law
does exist.118 Second, the dissent criticized the majority for creating a “double
standard of reasonableness” that perhaps created perverse incentives for officers
to violate the Fourth Amendment because of their “two layers of insulation from
liability.”119 Implicit in the dissent’s discussion is the notion that qualified immunity may be appropriate for “high government officials,” but perhaps it should
not be applied to law enforcement officers in the way it had been applied in other
contexts.120
In 2001, the Court again tweaked the qualified immunity standard when it
decided Saucier v. Katz, an excessive force case where a military police officer
shoved a potential protestor into a van at a speech delivered by Vice President
Al Gore.121 In Saucier, the Court established a procedural mechanism for analyzing qualified immunity by requiring courts to first address whether the defendant
violated a constitutional right.122 Only if answered in the affirmative would
courts then address whether the law was clearly established at the time of the
112
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conduct.123 This Saucier analysis rested upon the idea that deciding legal questions out of order undermines stare decisis because a court could essentially skip
addressing constitutionality altogether, which effectively eliminates precedential
possibility in qualified immunity cases.124
However, like in Harlow, this two-step procedural change sparked criticism
from the concurring opinion.125 And like in Harlow, that criticism rested upon
the Court duplicating the objective reasonableness analysis in both Fourth
Amendment cases and in qualified immunity.126 Ultimately, the Saucier concurring opinion seems to critique the new addition because it creates confusion and
does not serve judicial economy by duplicating the analysis.127
4. The Current Qualified Immunity Landscape
As the law now stands, “[q]ualified immunity attaches when an official’s
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”128 In short, qualified immunity
recognizes that “[a]n officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but
have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal
in those circumstances.”129 Courts have discretion in deciding both the order of
the elements (the linear Saucier approach or out-of-turn) and whether to address
one of the elements or both.130 For qualified immunity to attach, clearly established law must be defined with specificity, especially in the Fourth Amendment
context.131 The defense is so potent that not only does it “protect[] all but the
plainly incompetent,”132 it is meant to be not just a defense against liability but
an immunity from suit in the first place.133
Overcoming a successful qualified immunity defense requires the plaintiff
to point to case law where the facts and the holding specifically control the
123
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Id. (“This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for
our insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first
inquiry. The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip
ahead . . . .”).
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S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)).
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Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
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outcome of the case because of how closely analogous the case law is to the
present case.134 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has provided unclear guidance
as to which courts can clearly establish law, how many cases could clearly establish law, or even how factually similar the prior case law needs to be.135
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY’S PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS136
As this historical look at qualified immunity has shown, qualified immunity
is not a static doctrine and has undergone many substantive and procedural
changes. To some degree, this long history of consistent and drastic change may
be a problem itself because “unsettled” law may make it difficult for potential
litigants to consistently grasp what is required. The virtue to this topsy-turvy history is that a direct and clear pronouncement from Congress could finally solidify
this unsettled area and provide the Supreme Court solid guidance.
However, the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements have shifted how
qualified immunity operates, and the effects of these changes have created problems for litigants. Some of these problems stem from Congress’s failure to intervene;137 some of these problems are byproducts of complex, competing historical
revisions;138 some of these problems stem from the inherent tension between a
judicially created affirmative defense and a statute with language that does not
provide for any immunities;139 and some of these problems are procedural.140
134

Timothy T. Coates, Covering the Bases: Litigating Qualified Immunity on Summary Judgment, 60 MUN. LAW. 6, 10 (2019).
135
See Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503 (“Assuming without deciding that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity . . . .” (citing
City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015))).
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One creative, proposed solution to qualified immunity is to create constitutional smallclaims courts that state and local governments operate but provide that qualified immunity
cannot operate within these small claims courts. Ilya Somin, The Case for Creating “Constitutional Small Claims Courts”, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 23, 2019, 8:17 PM),
https://reason.com/2019/12/23/the-case-for-creating-constitutional-small-claims-courts
[https://perma.cc/7U74-QSHG]. Another worthwhile suggestion to fixing qualified immunity
comes from Colorado. Colorado passed bipartisan legislation that creates a “state analogue”
for § 1983 by permitting individuals to sue state officers in their individual capacity for violations of the state constitution and prohibits qualified immunity on these strictly state law
claims. Jay Schweikert, Colorado Passes Historic, Bipartisan Policing Reforms to Eliminate
Qualified Immunity, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (June 22, 2020, 11:31 AM),
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Because qualified immunity deals with compensating civil rights victims for constitutional violations, understanding how the doctrine practically operates can
help us understand the gravity of its effects.
Additionally, because of a widespread chorus growing around abolishing
qualified immunity,141 understanding qualified immunity’s problems is more important than ever. At the outset, I hope to be a limited apologist for the doctrine
at an unpopular time. As such, I recognize that qualified immunity—as currently
practiced—may negatively affect individual civil rights while only marginally
serving its espoused goals. However, at its core, qualified immunity’s policy justifications remain important.142 The question I seek to answer, therefore, is how
might we salvage the unpopular doctrine to limit the vices while retaining its
virtues?
To salvage qualified immunity, I propose that Congress must step in to provide the Supreme Court with proper guidance. In doing so, Congress must clarify
the qualified immunity standard, specify the breadth of its scope, and stamp its
seal of approval on it. The remainder of this Note will identify qualified immunity’s most pernicious problems, present proposals as part of a Congressional
package to fix the doctrine, and then point out some of the more likely criticisms
these suggested revisions will encounter.
A. The Legitimacy Problem
The first problem with qualified immunity is its legitimacy. As one critic of
qualified immunity observed, “[t]he Constitution . . . provides no basis for qualified immunity, and, on its face, the language of § 1983 ‘admits of no immunities.’ ”143 Indeed, the doctrine has been criticized as nothing more than a mere
“invention” of the judiciary to protect government officials from a very broadly
141

Supra note 5 and accompanying text. One new voice to the mix is a member of Congress—
Justin Amash—who announced that he would present legislation which would abolish qualified immunity. Justin Amash (@justinamash), TWITTER (May 31, 2020, 6:30 PM), https://twitter.com/justinamash/status/1267267244029083648 [https://perma.cc/9VQL-F4N7]. In his letter, Rep. Amash justifies abolishing qualified immunity for many of the reasons I will discuss
as issues in this Note: permitting repeated constitutional violations by skipping part of the
question, a judicially created doctrine that flies in the face of § 1983, and a disincentive to file
suit. Id. While Congress—or at least one member of it—stepping in is desirable, the hope is
that Congress can find a better way of striking the balance between tensions rather than stripping away the immunity entirely. One also wonders if this call for congressional abolishment
of the judicially created doctrine affected the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari in
the many cases presented to it in its conferencing.
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But see Jay Schweikert, The Most Common Defenses of Qualified Immunity, and Why
They’re Wrong, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (June 19, 2020, 2:17 PM), https://www.cato.o
rg/blog/most-common-defenses-qualified-immunity-why-theyre-wrong [https://perma.cc/LX
X4-26WE] (arguing that the Graham standard for assessing an officer’s conduct sufficiently
insulates officers from liability). However, as discussed supra Section I.B.3, while qualified
immunity may often operate with police officers in the excessive force context, qualified immunity also applies outside that context as well where the Graham factors are not at play.
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Rudovsky, supra note 55 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
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written law that would seem to impose strict scrutiny on government officials
when they violate constitutional rights.144 Justice Thomas himself takes the view
that qualified immunity, as a judicially created doctrine, strays from the statutory
text to which it is moored.145 Other scholars have similarly criticized qualified
immunity by questioning its lawfulness146 and its efficacy,147 while the public
itself has recently expressed strong disagreement over the doctrine.148
The rub of the matter is that if the Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly provide a basis for this doctrine, and if § 1983 truly does not intend for any
immunities, a judicially-created doctrine seems to fly in the face of what the rulemakers have decided. Indeed, while qualified immunity may have been borne
out of some limited common-law immunity doctrines, qualified immunity’s
eventual justification has rested in the Supreme Court’s public policy considerations.149 And when the Court justifies its extension of a common-law defense to
a statute entirely for public policy reasons, the judicial power looks awfully close
to the legislative power. This naturally vexes some people because the judiciary
appears to legislate from the bench.150 When the judiciary creates or applies an
affirmative defense to a statute that never intended for such defenses, the practical effect is that this act amends the law.151 And because amending law is legislative in nature, the constitutional balance of powers could be upset as one branch
appears to be undertaking the job of another.
This balance of powers issue is certainly not unique to qualified immunity
because common-law doctrines are otherwise well-accepted in the legal community. But it is a more striking issue in this context. Most likely, this point of contention stems from the fact that the judicially created doctrine here denies victims
compensation when the “big bad government” is the actor. Additionally, to some,
qualified immunity has ended up resembling an “unqualified” immunity because
of the sheer improbability of succeeding against the government on such
claims.152 Finally, the doctrine affirmatively “vitiates the very statute that was
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Leef, supra note 53.
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our § 1983 qualified immunity doctrine appears to stray from the statutory text, I would grant
this petition.”).
146
Baude, supra note 11, at 88 (stating that qualified immunity may be unlawful because it
“lacks legal justification”).
147
Schwartz, supra note 12 (showing qualified immunity in practice fails to do its intended
job).
148
Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers for Misconduct, supra note 15; Ekins, supra note 15.
149
Rudovsky, supra note 55, at 38.
150
Jason Pye, How the Supreme Court Legislated from the Bench to Create Qualified Immunity for Government Officials, FREEDOMWORKS (June 2, 2020), https://www.freedomworks.org/content/how-supreme-court-legislated-bench-create-qualified-immunity-government-officials [https://perma.cc/ETH2-34ZV].
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intended to protect all persons . . . in their rights.”153 These common convergent
criticisms strike at the core of the doctrine’s legitimacy and therefore need to be
addressed more than common-law immunities in other areas of the law. These
criticisms perhaps strike even more intensely now. In potential cases of racially
motivated excessive force, § 1983, which is a remedial measure for racial injustice, appears to be subverted when police officers receive immunity for the very
actions § 1983 was enacted to prevent.154
1. The Legitimacy Fix
Illegitimacy is a serious problem because people are more or less likely to
accept laws and even court decisions when the public perceives them as being
legitimate.155 Legitimacy takes on added importance on divisive issues.156 Qualified immunity’s legitimacy has been largely questioned on grounds that it lacks
any constitutional or statutory basis and is contrary to § 1983’s original intent.157
Any proposal to cure qualified immunity’s legitimacy must consider two questions: which branch is best suited to legitimize qualified immunity, and through
which legal or procedural mechanisms should that branch legitimize qualified
immunity?
a. Which Branch Should Legitimize Qualified Immunity?
Both the Supreme Court and Congress could act to legitimize qualified immunity. It is not hard to find compelling reasons to let the Supreme Court handle
qualified immunity. After all, the Supreme Court is the branch who created, or
rather applied, this doctrine to § 1983.158 Indeed, Justice Alito has made the case
that because the Supreme Court created the doctrine, Congress should not intervene and should let the Supreme Court self-correct, at least with respect to Saucier v. Katz sequencing.159 This argument carries force with at least one scholar
who claims that the Supreme Court, not Congress, should amend the doctrine
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precisely because it has taken such invested ownership in it.160 Likewise, the Supreme Court’s history of constant revisions shows there has been at least some
implicit acceptance of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy to rule on the issue. Finally, some may find a controversial doctrine, even while policy based, is best
settled through the Supreme Court, which could be perceived as the most legitimate institution.161
However, these thoughts are misplaced in the qualified immunity context.
Congress is in the best position to legitimize qualified immunity because Congress enacted § 1983, and qualified immunity only operates as a defense to
§ 1983. In other words, Congress is in the best position as the authors of § 1983
to determine whether any defense to § 1983 should exist.
This rationale is only strengthened when looking at the commonly accepted
rules of statutory construction: plain meaning and congressional intent. Section
1983 has no explicit reference to any defenses; it “admits of no immunities.”162
Furthermore, Congress had a well-documented and specific goal in enacting
§ 1983.163 Congress enacted § 1983 to provide a private cause of action against
government officials for violating an individual’s constitutional rights.164 Congress enacted this statute to prevent government officials from using their authority to violate individual rights, especially when the rights deprivation was
motivated by race.165 Congress’s statutory enactment of a qualified immunity defense would create a legislative history and a trail of legislative intent that would
aid the Court in determining the scope of a government official’s liability.166 In
light of these indicators, a strong defense that deprives plaintiffs of that cause of
action seems to cut against what Congress originally intended. At the very least,
it limits § 1983’s efficacy.
In addition, Congress is also best suited to address qualified immunity because they are the branch responsible for making law, and Congress is in the best
position to make critical policy judgments that affect the laws they pass. Congress’s role as representatives of the people put them in the prime position to
gauge the values of the people and to craft law and policy that reflects those
160
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values. Importantly, Congress should step in because qualified immunity does
reflect important policy judgments—beyond simple judicial economy—that the
courts themselves recognize.167 These policy judgments are even more critical
now as qualified immunity is criticized as permitting the very actions that § 1983
was enacted to address.168 In fact, because of the highly politicized race issues
attending qualified immunity right now, some see the Supreme Court’s failure to
intervene when it had the chance as an abdication of their role in the qualified
immunity context and an implicit endorsement of congressional intervention.169
Therefore, Congress should be the branch to make essential policy judgments
regarding when immunity should apply, as states have done so in generally waiving and retaining their sovereign immunity.170
Finally, another compelling reason for Congress to legitimize the doctrine is
that they can address all of qualified immunity’s issues at once; they can start on
a clean slate with a consistent intent and provide greater uniformity. The Supreme Court, however, is limited by legal doctrines, such as stare decisis,171 and
it can address issues only as they are presented to the Court. Unfortunately, sometimes it can be difficult to find the right procedural case to address the proper
issues, and the Court may not be able to get one case that would sufficiently
present each issue needing address. What could result is a time-consuming,
patchwork-style doctrine. Indeed, history has already shown that the Supreme
Court has created inconsistent standards over time, and there has been a substantial shift in the Court’s function.172 While passing meaningful qualified immunity
167

The Supreme Court recognizes that while judicial economy is a recognized public policy
consideration, qualified immunity is borne out of other concerns also: “deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office” and “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’ ” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). These rationales go beyond mere judicial economy and enter the realm of public policy considerations
Congress should be making. This is because these public policy justifications go beyond court
administration; they substantively affect access to a statutory cause of action.
168
Compare Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point
Amid Protests, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3esDevA [https://perma.cc/8JFG32Q6] (discussing how qualified immunity is at the center of systemic racism debates), with
Mead, supra note 33, at 518 n.6.
169
Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Rejects Cases on Qualified Immunity Used to Shield
Police Officers, A.B.A. J. (June 16, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme-court-rejects-cases-on-qualified-immunity-used-to-shield-police-officers
[https://perma.cc/7F7G-SPXX] (“The Supreme Court’s deeply disappointing decision today
to punt on the critical issue of official immunity, in this time of national reckoning over police
violence, places the ball squarely in Congress’ court.” (quoting David Cole, Legal Dir.,
ACLU)).
170
Infra note 190.
171
Aaron L. Nielsen & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1856–63 (2018) (discussing how the Court is unlikely to make
any changes to qualified immunity because it likely qualifies for treatment under “superpowered” statutory stare decisis principles).
172
Id. at 1859–60 (describing the Court’s standard as “zigzagging”).

21 NEV. L.J. 835

856

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:2

legislation through Congress may take time, Congress has at least expressed its
interest in wading into this policy controversy.173
b. But Through What Approach Should Congress Formalize the
Doctrine?
While Congress may be the best branch to legitimize the qualified immunity
doctrine, there are different approaches to do so. As one approach, Congress
could pass some form of resolution, which have varying purposes and legal effects.174 Simple resolutions, for example, are “[o]ccasionally . . . employed to express the body’s view on some public question” even though they ordinarily deal
with internal procedures.175 Qualified immunity is certainly a public question,
but a simple resolution lacks the force of law,176 so any pronouncement would
be all bark and no bite. While this type of resolution may act as a tool to generate
meaningful conversation,177 more than a conversation is needed here.
Concurrent resolutions are perhaps stronger pronouncements than simple
resolutions because they express the sentiments of both House and Senate.178
These resolutions are “generally used to express facts, principles, opinions, or
the legislative will.”179 These resolutions have been used in the past to influence
judicial interpretation and inform others of the legislative intent behind a passed
bill.180 However, because these pronouncements lack the force of law, courts can
use them as aids but are not obligated to respect the resolution’s findings.181 In
the qualified immunity context, while a simple resolution may be nothing more
than a conversation starter, concurrent resolutions go one step further because
courts can use them to aid in interpreting § 1983’s intent. However, these resolutions will still fail to provide meaningful reform182 because courts are not required to respect Congress’s findings, and they likely would not under stare
173

See End Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020).
See generally Denys P. Myers, Joint Resolutions Are Laws, 28 A.B.A. J. 33 (1942). While
there are three different types of resolutions, they are all still considered less formal and less
authoritative than bills. Rankin M. Gibson, Congressional Concurrent Resolutions: An Aid
Statutory Interpretation?, 37 A.B.A. J. 421, 422–23 (1951).
175
Myers, supra note 174, at 35.
176
Id. (“ ‘[S]imple’ resolutions–have no legislative value beyond the precincts of Congress . . . .”).
177
Id. (describing how legislators use this tool deceptively and describing it as “shadow boxing in front of public opinion”).
178
Gibson, supra note 174, at 424.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 479–80.
181
Id. at 424, 480.
182
But just because I argue they lack meaningful reform, which I define as the inability to
create legally binding guidance or precedent, does not mean they otherwise lack value or importance, even in this context. See Robert Longley, What Is a ‘Sense of Congress’ Resolution?,
THOUGHTCO. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/sense-of-congress-resolutions3322308 [https://perma.cc/7L2T-5QM4] (describing simple and concurrent resolutions as
“ ‘sense of’ resolution[s]” and describing ways they are used).
174
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decisis principles183 or other principles that would diminish the concurrent resolution’s efficacy.184
Joint resolutions differ from the prior two resolutions because joint resolutions carry the force and weight of law.185 This types of legislation is often used
“as supplementary legislation to enunciate an attitude, delineate a policy, [or]
touch upon extra-legislative matters.”186 In essence, these joint resolutions seem
to perform the same functions as the other resolutions—creating dialogue and
signifying support—but perhaps with more authority since they carry the weight
of law.187 However, the downside to this approach—or any of the resolution approaches—is that they are unlikely to create meaningful reform, either because
they cannot by themselves or because they just have not been used in that way.
Ultimately, even the strongest resolution tool—the joint resolution—likely is not
the proper approach because both joint resolutions and actual bills require the
same procedures to become law. If both approaches require the same procedure,
and really have the same effect, why not expend political capital to send the
strongest message through an actual bill?
Another approach Congress could take to legitimize qualified immunity is
to formally create or endorse the doctrine through statute. This approach is better
than any of the resolutions because it is Congress’s most powerful and formal
tool and thus arguably sends the strongest message while retaining all the virtues
of any of the resolution approaches. For example, this approach dispenses with
any criticism that the doctrine would be unlawful because Congress would essentially be amending § 1983 in enacting a statutory qualified immunity doctrine.188 Additionally, for the same reasons, no separation of powers concerns
183

Nielson & Walker, supra note 171, at 1855–63 (discussing how the Court is unlikely to
make any changes to qualified immunity because it likely qualifies for treatment under “superpowered” statutory stare decisis principles).
184
At least in the state court context, the time between original passage of the bill and the
concurrent resolution will determine its weight. Gibson, supra note 174, at 480. Because the
span between when § 1983 was enacted and today is over 100 years, any concurrent resolution
would likely not be accorded much weight, especially in light of the Court’s own longstanding
acceptance of qualified immunity.
185
Myers, supra note 174, at 36–37.
186
Id. at 37.
187
See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 78, 116th Cong. (2019) (expressing support for freedom of conscience principles under the First Amendment); see also Scott R. Anderson & Margaret Taylor, The Long Road Ahead for the Congressional Resolutions on Iran, LAWFARE (Jan. 9, 2020,
10:04 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/long-road-ahead-congressional-resolutions-iran
[https://perma.cc/XR2A-VPA9] (discussing the legal effect of joint and concurrent resolutions). Regardless of their varying legal effects, they all could serve to engage in a dialogue
with the public and with the Supreme Court. These pressures may foster greater change, and,
at the very least, if not increase its legitimacy, prevent the public from immediately seeking to
de-legitimize the doctrine through prohibition.
188
This type of dialogue between the Court and Congress—where Congress enacts a bill after
Court rulings—is Congress essentially capitalizing on its role to ensure the Court interprets its
laws correctly, and this has already occurred in the civil rights context. See Michelman, supra
note 160, at 2019.
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would exist because the legislative power would simply be doing its constitutionally prescribed function: making law.189
Moreover, statutorily legitimizing the doctrine represents the best approach
because Congress would bind the Supreme Court when analyzing § 1983 claims.
Rather than rely on the several differing doctrinal interpretations from the circuit
courts on major issues, Congress could sweepingly enact new, explicit, and clear
guidance for the Court. Because courts often look to legislative history to determine the scope of a statute, Congress could use the legislative history to send
clear messages about its intent, the scope of the new qualified immunity, and
how vigorously courts should construe the statute. This would help fix one of
qualified immunity’s most pernicious problems: a lack of uniformity.
Finally, this approach provides great value because a statute would facilitate
extensive public debate and an accompanying public record. Because of the public interest regarding qualified immunity, an opportunity to have open, public
debate where legislators’ votes are recorded will be an incredibly valuable tool
for the public to hold their representatives accountable. Indeed, this would also
allow Congress to engage meaningfully with their constituency to determine
which values or public policies they want to infuse into the new law—just as
states have done when waiving their sovereign immunity.190 While sovereign immunity and qualified immunity are different, the reasoning for deliberating when
to waive—or bestow—an immunity is the same: they are driven by public policy,
and the legislative branch is best seated to gauge public policy. And these public
policy distinctions are truly important because they showcase the precise values
each state—or country—esteems.191 In a world post-George Floyd—with riots,
189

One scholar in favor of judicial oversight on qualified immunity argues that there are less
separation of powers concerns in the § 1983 context because Congress has the authority to
simply rewrite the law the way it sees fit. Id. at 2018–19. My proposal takes this seriously by
arguing that Congress should do just that, not by rewriting § 1983 per se, but explicitly referencing § 1983 in delineating qualified immunity’s reach.
190
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (providing that Nevada waives its sovereign immunity,
though with some exceptions). Indeed, one critical factor driving qualified immunity is its
relation to sovereign immunity. Because the United States operates under a dual sovereign
system, both the states and America have their own system for asserting immunity for tortious
acts. Thus, each state—like Nevada—can waive their common-law sovereign immunity. See
Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States
in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REV. 189, 195 (1981) (“[N]o
state can be sued in its own courts without its consent, regardless of the nature of the claim.”).
But, like Nevada, each state had the opportunity to retain sovereign immunity for certain situations, and each state legislature had the opportunity to deliberate on the policy reasons surrounding each of them. However, qualified immunity is a federal law defense, and § 1983 is a
jurisdictional hook solely for federal law claims. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Importantly, § 1983 claims
are against private individuals—though it is conduct from their official government capacity
that works—so a qualified immunity defense is more like a cousin to sovereign immunity than
a descendant. Regardless, the principle is similar in that, like the state legislatures, Congress
should concretely deliberate and decide—based upon prevailing public policy reasons—when
to bestow an immunity rather than waiving one, like in the sovereign immunity context.
191
E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.033 (providing immunity for a failure to discover even if a duty
to inspect exists); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0332 (granting immunity for acts and omissions of
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protests, and fires blazing, and a national dialogue on this issue developing—it
may be more important now than ever for public representatives in Congress to
engage meaningfully and openly regarding when and under what circumstances
we should grant officers immunity when they violate constitutional rights.
Finally, as an alternative but hopefully an addition, Congress could work
with the Supreme Court to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to incorporate specific pleading standards when dealing with qualified immunity
claims.192 There are several virtues to this approach. First, as in other cases, this
reduces legitimacy concerns as Congress would be legislatively ratifying a defense to its own legislatively created law.193 Second, because the Supreme Court
and Congress can simultaneously amend the federal rules,194 Congress would not
only legitimize the doctrine but could engage in meaningful dialogue with the
Supreme Court regarding the Court’s jurisprudence on Congress’s statute and
sending the Court a strong message. Third, this would give Congress the opportunity to address on-the-ground issues with qualified immunity, such as its efficacy, by striking what it sees as the best balance between the doctrine’s competing policy considerations through a new pleading standard.195 Finally, in addition
to adopting a new pleading standard for qualified immunity, Congress could provide more detailed guidance to the courts on how to implement that qualified

volunteer school crossing guards). These immunities have important public policy considerations—like encouraging volunteerism—which, without, would interfere with state goals. Congress has the opportunity now to promote certain values, and it should capitalize on this opportunity, or, at the very least, enact legislation that would permit each state the policy decision
to allow, disallow, or modify its own qualified immunity for state and local officials. Perhaps
this decentralized approach would better allow government officials to engage meaningfully
with their community and create a community coalition.
192
See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (adopting a different pleading standard for particular torts—fraud).
Later in this paper, I propose that Congress adopt a specific pleading standard for qualified
immunity. Infra Section II.D.1. While it may not be a common practice to adopt specific pleading standards for specific torts, that Congress has already singled out certain torts for this
treatment provides some basis for adopting specific pleading standards for other torts in other
contexts, such as in qualified immunity.
193
See generally Ronald C. Moe & Steven C. Teel, Congress as Policy-Maker: A Necessary
Reappraisal, 85 POL. SCI. Q. 443 (1970) (discussing how Congress has become weaker as it is
perceived less as a policy-originator); Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive
Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 46, 46–48 (1976)
(discussing how Congress should be the main policymaker in making value-based judgments).
While these two articles really primarily discuss how Congress should push back against the
Executive Branch in order to reclaim its role as policymaker, the same should remain true with
the relationship between Congress and the Court: Congress should push back when the Court
makes impermissible policy judgments.
194
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74; FED. R. CIV. P. hist. n., VII (2019). See generally Catherine T.
Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1099 (2002) (discussing the rulemaking process regarding the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
195
See infra Section II.D for an examination of how qualified immunity is undermined
through its execution and how a different pleading mechanism would strike a better balance.
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immunity standard through the notes section.196 Such an approach may help ensure greater uniformity197 between courts, as the lack thereof has been a particularly troubling aspect of qualified immunity jurisprudence.198
In the end, I propose that Congress officially enshrine the doctrine of qualified immunity through statute because it is likely their strongest vehicle to publicly convey the doctrine. However, ideally, Congress would also adopt a new
pleading standard through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for qualified immunity cases for reasons discussed infra Section II.D.1.
B. The Uniformity Problem
The second problem with current qualified immunity jurisprudence is the
rampant discord and lack of uniformity between circuit courts on several fundamental questions, most importantly: What counts as clearly established law?199
Relatedly, this lack of uniformity has also created intra-circuit problems that
could create inequitable results for plaintiffs.200
The Supreme Court itself has had varying policies over time and has posited
different standards201 that have given insufficient guidance to circuit courts. For
example, the Court has emphasized that even intra-circuit disagreement does not
guarantee qualified immunity,202 especially if it is a single case.203 Likewise,
while the Court has sometimes argued that a “consensus of cases of persuasive
authority” may suffice as clearly established law in the absence of controlling

196

See, e.g., MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (using a
specific example to illustrate how the rule would work in practice); see also Struve, supra note
194, at 1158 (discussing some of the functions the notes can serve). See generally FED. R. CIV.
P. Advisory Notes (2020) (showing how each “note” provides additional guidance to courts
on how to interpret or implement the rule itself). Of importance, we know that the Supreme
Court itself often holds the notes in high regards and some justices have often resorted to using
the notes to interpret the rules. Struve, supra note 194, at 1161.
197
But see Struve, supra note 194, at 1152–58 (discussing interpretation problems regarding
the Advisory Notes and how some see them as nonbinding).
198
Infra Section II.B. But see generally Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1 (2016) (discussing how the rule
amendment process may not ever lead to consequential change from Congress to the pleading
standards). While the 2015 amendments may not have resulted in meaningful change to pleading standards, such changes in the future are not impossible.
199
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 19; Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445,
447–48 (2000) (describing different circuit approaches).
200
One fundamental question—mandatory Saucier sequencing—I address later, but it is another significant area where courts are not uniform, leaving some judges to focus on one portion of the analysis at the expense of others. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The
New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42–46 (2015).
201
Nielson & Walker, supra note 171, at 1859–60 (describing the Court’s standard as “zigzagging”).
202
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009).
203
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011).
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cases,204 the Court has made recent indications that perhaps not even a case from
a controlling authority may clearly establish law.205
No wonder, then, that the circuit courts likewise maintain very different
standards in meaningful ways. For example, both the Ninth and Eighth Circuits
take a very broad-based approach in defining clearly established law.206 In both
circuits, the law can be clearly established through binding authority, any available decisional law (including from other circuits and state courts), and even
from cases that are not “on point” but leave just one logical conclusion.207 Such
a broad standard benefits plaintiffs because a plaintiff can pull accepted arguments from a greater body of law to argue that the defendant had fair notice they
violated constitutional rights. Similarly, this standard also imposes a greater burden on defendants for the same reason: defendants must be aware of the continuing case law in other jurisdictions.
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits, however, have a narrower approach to qualified immunity than either the Ninth or Eight Circuits.208 While the Ninth Circuit
looks to all decisional law, the Sixth Circuit rejects the idea that one case from
another circuit suffices to establish the law for qualified immunity purposes.209
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit permits looking to circuit splits, but circuit splits
alone, without some controlling authority within the circuit, will be insufficient.210 In these circuits, it is more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail past qualified
immunity because the body of law they can appeal to is more limited than in the
Ninth Circuit. Similarly, the burden to defendants is lighter because the body of
case law that can put them on notice is limited.
This disuniformity between circuits also exists with respect to allocating the
burdens of proof and persuasion. Currently, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and

204

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
779–80 (2014) (“To defeat immunity here, then, respondent must show at a minimum either
(1) that the officers’ conduct in this case was materially different from the conduct in Brosseau
or (2) that between February 21, 1999, and July 18, 2004, there emerged either ‘controlling
authority’ or a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’ ” (quoting Ashcroft, 563
U.S. at 741–42)).
205
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 n.8 (2018) (“We have not yet decided
what precedents—other than our own—qualify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.”); City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019); City of San
Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015) (“But even if ‘a controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established federal law in these circumstances,’ . . . .” (quoting
Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 17 (2014))).
206
See Coates, supra note 134, at 9–10.
207
Id. at 9–10 (quoting Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 2007)); Buckley
v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998); Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d
1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that without controlling authority, courts can look to state
courts, other circuits, district courts, and even unpublished district court cases for clearly established law).
208
Coates, supra note 134.
209
Id.
210
See id.
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Eleventh Circuits allocate the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff.211 The First,
Second, Third, Ninth, and D.C. circuits allocate the burden of persuasion to the
defendant.212 Two circuits, the Fourth and Eighth, split the burdens between the
defendant and plaintiff and even allocate them differently.213 And how the circuits allocate the burden of proof is just as messy and contradictory.214
But does this matter? Are disagreements between circuits on qualified immunity all that important? After all, the nature of the court system permits this
kind of disagreement on many issues. The answer is unequivocally yes, for two
reasons.
First, qualified immunity is a creature of federal law. Though it applies
equally to federal officers and state officers, it is manifestly unfair to hold some
officers more accountable than others based on nothing more than their geographic location. Since § 1983 is a federal statute meant to apply equally to all
state actors, state actors should accordingly be held to the same rough standards
across the nation. This is especially true where federal officers must enforce federal law that crosses borders. Depending on where officers commit an alleged
constitutional violation, they may be held to different standards of conduct. There
is nothing fair about fair notice when courts can simply impose different standards of conduct under the same federal statutory hook. This leads to inequitable
applications: the immunity will either act as a shield for federal officials (they
had no fair notice, so they cannot be liable) or as an unfair sword (they had no
fair notice, but they should be liable anyway).
Second, the real problem lies with the inequitable results for plaintiffs. In
some circuits, there is a higher bar to receive compensation for injuries than in
other circuits.215 And these discrepancies are real and affect the degree to which
people receive compensation. For example, one study showed that as many as
9.2 percent and 6.7 percent of cases in two district courts were dismissed on
qualified immunity grounds compared to only 2.3 percent, 1.2 percent, and 1.0

211

Kenneth Duvall, Burdens of Proof and Qualified Immunity, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 135, 143–44
(2012).
212
Id. at 144–45.
213
Id. at 145 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit plac[es] the burden of establishing that the law was clearly
established on the defendant and that the defendant did not violate a constitutional right on the
plaintiff, and the Eighth Circuit do[es] just the opposite.”).
214
Id. at 146–48. This author contends that there are actually four steps to qualified immunity,
and that the defendant bears the burden on two—establishing entitlement to qualified immunity or proving exceptional circumstances as an exception to objective reasonableness—and the
plaintiff bears the burden on the other two. Id. at 157.
215
This Note discusses at length the proposition that different circuits have different standards
and mechanisms regarding qualified immunity, which dis-uniformity of necessity creates
higher or lower bars to compensation, since some plaintiffs may have to look to limited case
law versus others who have the whole expanse of case law at their disposal, and some courts
tend to vigorously dismiss litigation at earlier stages than others. See supra notes 130, 134–
35, 199–200, 206–14 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 216, 225–29 and accompanying text.
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percent in three other district courts.216 To some degree, this gives credence to
the notion that constitutional rights matter more in some circuits than in others.
No wonder the Supreme Court takes circuit splits seriously when determining
whether to grant cert petitions. Additionally, this may be the reason qualified
immunity questions often appear on the Court’s docket.
1. The Uniformity Fix
Once again, both Congress and the Supreme Court have the power to create
greater uniformity. On one hand, the Supreme Court may seem the ideal body to
clarify qualified immunity’s standards because it created the defense,217 and it
could possibly offer clarification more quickly than Congress due to the number
of cases it could choose to see each term. In practical terms, the Supreme Court
has nine individuals while Congress has 435. This may result in less lock-jam,
especially since justices from both sides of the political aisle have signaled their
opposition to qualified immunity.218
However, Congress is best suited to make this determination for several reasons. First, though the Supreme Court has had many opportunities to clarify qualified immunity—and has taken several cracks at it—they have consistently failed
to meaningfully clarify the standard and may have harmed it.219 Second, as previously discussed, Congress is best suited to address qualified immunity’s policy
goals.220 Furthermore, qualified immunity is not a common-law immunity from
common-law crimes but a judicially-created immunity from a statutory enactment that “admits of no immunities.”221 Since the judiciary carved out an immunity to a statutory right of action, Congress should “speak” to the judiciary
and specifically carve out the immunities it sees fit to the statutes that it enacts.
While Congress may be the best branch to clarify qualified immunity, Congress’s rubber stamp on current jurisprudence will do little to unify law between
circuits or clarify what is required for both victims and defense practitioners.
Therefore, to fix qualified immunity’s lack of uniformity, I propose that

216

Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, 114 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1101,
1125–26 (2020).
217
Justice Alito expressly stated that the Supreme Court is the best branch to amend at least
some qualified immunity aspects because it is judge-made law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 233–34 (2009).
218
Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Supreme Court Refuses to Reconsider Immunity that
Shields Police Accused of Brutality, WASH. POST (June 15, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-refuses-to-reconsider-immunity-that-shiel
ds-police-accused-of-brutality/2020/06/15/1cfc444c-ae7f-11ea-8f56-63f38c990077_story.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/H6VN-42TG] (discussing how Justices Thomas and Sotomayor are ideologically opposites and how Justice Sotomayor often dissents from her colleagues when qualified immunity has been granted).
219
See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
220
Supra Section II.A.1.
221
Rudovsky, supra note 55 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).

21 NEV. L.J. 835

864

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:2

Congress should adopt the qualified immunity doctrine via statute,222 and, at the
same time, adopt new standards to govern its practice that will clarify some of
the problems that have created dis-uniformity in the courts of appeals. Specifically, in legalizing qualified immunity by statute, Congress must clarify (1)
which court(s) can clearly establish the law, (2) which level of factual similarity
is required to clearly establish the law, (3) when exceptions to qualified immunity should apply, and (4) when officers should not be indemnified even if they
have been found liable. Because qualified immunity does have value, refraining
from abolishing the doctrine when it could be practically reformed to avoid today’s errors is desirable.
a. Which Courts Can Clearly Establish the Law?
Congress, in adopting qualified immunity by statute, must clarify which
courts can clearly establish the law.223 I propose that Congress should affirm that
the Supreme Court can clearly establish the law. Outside the Supreme Court, I
propose that only circuit court decisions in which the suit is brought should be
able to clearly establish the law. This proposal rejects the Ninth Circuit approach
of looking to any available decision law.224
One major virtue to this approach is that it creates greater uniformity by limiting the number of courts and judges who will create binding qualified immunity
precedent. This means there will be less total binding case law, and litigants will
have less case law from which to pull arguments. Indeed, for these very reasons,
it is proper to dispense with letting state courts create any precedent on qualified
immunity.225 And because the only courts who can create binding precedent are
appeals courts, the law will be more slow-moving.226 Slower-moving, more uniform rules are desirable because they ensure plaintiffs and defendants in different
circuits are treated equally under the same federal law.227 And uniformity also

222

Supra Section II.A.1 (discussing why I believe Congress should adopt qualified immunity
via statute rather than through other mechanisms and why Congress is better suited than the
Supreme Court to fix qualified immunity).
223
Coates, supra note 134, at 8 (discussing how the Court has not yet provided clarity regarding this subject).
224
Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 2007).
225
AM. L. INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 164–68 (1969) (discussing how federal courts are better positioned because of their
expertise to hear questions on federal matters and that uniformity is necessary on federal questions).
226
Although circuit courts often create circuit splits (which undermine uniformity), they are
also “generally hesitant to depart from precedent set in other jurisdictions, despite being under
no obligation to adhere to decisions by sister circuits.” Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity,
94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1578 (2008). Additionally, uniformity has often been seen by the courts
themselves as necessary—or at least desirable—when interpreting federal law, and limiting
the courts who can interpret the federal law serves that purpose. Id. at 1580 n.34.
227
Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United States’ Experience, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1081, 1090–91 (1986).
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helps ensure predictability228 at the outset of litigation, which could improve argumentation, provide attorneys greater knowledge for screening cases, and in
turn reduce litigation costs.229
Another virtue is that this reduces the resource burdens on individual defendants. The resource burden occurs at two stages: training/maintenance and
litigation. Each officer receives some form of legal training to understand the
rules within which they must operate. Presumably, these policies are hopefully
based on proper interpretations of the law, though sometimes they are not. And
when officers are sued, they must look to the legal rules that exist. Each action
requires some resource expenditure—whether time, money, or other resource. In
other words, “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.”230 Someone—whether
the city who trained them or the officer who committed the tort—must pay for
resource expenditures.
The larger the realm of liability at each stage, the more likely someone must
expend greater resources. For example, if we were to take the Ninth Circuit approach, cities may expend greater resources by having their legal staff evaluate
non-controlling, extra-jurisdictional case law to ensure compliance with legal
rules in other jurisdictions, just for the sake of liability. Because, as here, I propose narrowing the battlefield, both cities and officers can focus their training
solely on the case law that exists in their jurisdiction. This likely will reduce costs
as the players become more familiar with the rules, and there certainly will be
less case law through which they would need to sort—either for litigation or
training purposes.
While § 1983 imposes individual liability on the officers,231 and thus would
put the burden on the officer to expend those resources, the widespread use of
indemnity agreements has effectively shifted that resource burden to the municipality.232 Unfortunately, resource disparities exist between government entities
228

Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38–40 (1994).
229
See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Certainty vs. Flexibility in the Conflict of Laws, PENN. L.:
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 2019, at 9, 15 n.81 (discussing how more predictable and
certain rules can reduce litigation costs).
230
ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 160, 227 (1966).
231
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, FED. JUD. CTR., SECTION 1983
LITIGATION, 96 (2d ed. 2008), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Sec19832.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HX3-WMAZ] (discussing the difference between official and private capacity suits and their respective monetary obligations). As a practical matter, however, officers
are almost always indemnified by their employer. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 890 (noting that
officers between 2006 and 2011 only paid .02 percent of $730 million in civil suit because the
municipality usually indemnifies them). The rationale still remains the same because § 1983
ultimately imposes the burden on the individual, and municipalities will not always indemnify
officers, such as when on-duty officers act outside the scope of their duties. Teressa E. Ravenell & Armando Brigandi, The Blurred Blue Line: Municipal Liability, Police Indemnification, and Financial Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 62 VILL. L. REV. 839, 845–48
(2017).
232
Scwartz, supra note 22, at 900–02. The fact that some indemnity waivers will not cover an
individual officer’s conduct, see id., and because ultimately § 1983 creates monetary
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for various reasons, and legal staff must make decisions about how extensively
to research issues for both training purposes and litigation defense. Enlarging the
field of battle could exacerbate resource disparities and put some defendants at a
disadvantage compared to their similarly situated but differently located counterparts. And narrowing the battlefield to the specified controlling authority creates uniform, specific rules that could improve arguments on both ends because
the litigants will have less case law to sift through, and this could focus their
arguments on what is important.
Another virtue to narrowing the field of battle to controlling circuit court
precedent is that it best comports with qualified immunity’s underlying rationale:
fair notice. Qualified immunity is about ensuring that officers do not incur individual liability for making quick decisions in “hazy” areas of the law.233 Arguably, the law is still hazy when new legal principles are espoused at the district
court level because the district court’s ruling has not been properly validated by
an appeals court. Our federal system has built-in appeals courts precisely to ensure that the district court gets it right. While courts of appeals affirm lower court
decisions the vast majority of the time,234 this number is much higher for qualified immunity cases.235 Either way, if one policy reason for qualified immunity
is to protect officers’ ability to make decisions when the law is unclear, permitting the district court to wrongfully impose liability at any amount is unacceptably high. In short, when even learned judges disagree on the constitutional rules,
it is manifestly unfair to hold a mostly legally untrained officer responsible for
their erroneous, in-the-field decisions. Limiting clearly established law only to
circuit courts ensures, as far as possible, that purported constitutional rules have
been vetted before they impose liability on those officers.
However, there are good arguments to confine the field of battle even more
narrowly, letting only the Supreme Court clearly establish the law. Such a proposal prioritizes fair notice because the legal rules would only come from one
body, and those cases would be more easily identifiable and uniform compared
to the various rules developed at the circuit court level. Additionally, while courts
of appeals rarely overturn lower court decisions, the Supreme Court very often
overturns the decisions of cases it actually hears.236 These issues may be more
obligations on the individual officer, an individual officer may still need to expend substantial
resources in his defense, which justifies a rule of limiting resource expenditure on the defendant—one of the major purposes animating qualified immunity in the first place.
233
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“Qualified immunity operates in this case, then,
just as it does in others, to protect officers from the sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive
and acceptable force.’ ” (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926–27 (11th Cir.
2000))).
234
Barry C. Edwards, Why Appeals Courts Rarely Reverse Lower Courts: An Experimental
Study to Explore Affirmation Bias, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1035, 1037 (2019).
235
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1189–90 (1990).
236
Edwards, supra note 234, at 1039. But the fact that the Supreme Court does not hear many
of the various appeals means that, in practical terms, the Supreme Court only ever reverses
less than 1 percent of all appealed cases. Id.
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pressing in the qualified immunity context due to the substantial attention the
Court has given it, which is perhaps why the Court has been very persistent in
overturning qualified immunity decisions.237 Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court has questioned—but never decided—whether a single decision
from a court of appeals can constitute clearly established law.238
One major problem with permitting the Supreme Court alone to clearly establish law is that it could result in constitutional stagnation due to the Supreme
Court’s exceptionally low number of appeals cases it hears each year.239 And
such stagnation could grant defendants a superpowered defense in qualified immunity because defendants could essentially have several bites at the apple before the Supreme Court’s caseload permits it to hear the case. Were Congress to
require that clearly established law come only from the Supreme Court, this may
incentivize the Court to prioritize developing constitutional law by hearing far
more qualified immunity cases each term.
In the end, compelling reasons support rejecting the Ninth Circuit approach
because it creates greater resource burdens on small cities and their officers. Essentially, the Ninth Circuit requires officers and attorneys to constantly monitor
extra-jurisdictional case law, which imposes greater costs than if they only
looked at controlling authority. It also flips the concept of fair notice on its head
because it permits liability based off non-binding case law far removed from the
officer or attorney and on unvetted district court legal conclusions. In effect, the
Ninth Circuit approach “bind[s] this circuit by the decisions of others.”240 But
even in small municipalities, municipal attorneys have some ethical requirements
to pay attention to controlling case law and to disclose any controlling, adverse
law.241

237

White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (“In the last five years, this Court has issued a
number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity cases.” (citing City of San
Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015))).
238
City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (“Assuming without deciding
that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established law for purposes of qualified
immunity . . . .” (citing Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776))).
239
Compare Oliver Roeder, The Supreme Court’s Caseload Is on Track to Be the Lightest in
70 Years, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 17, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-courts-caseload-is-on-track-to-be-the-lightest-in-70-years
[https://perma.cc/65P7-W99E], with Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019
[https://perma.cc/9ULG-E3Q3].
240
Coates, supra note 134 (quoting Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987)).
241
Arguably, the model rules impose a competency standard on municipal attorneys that requires them to be just smart enough and search just enough case law to be considered competent. See MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
Municipal attorneys who do not pay attention to controlling case law when instructing their
police officers on the Fourth Amendment might therefore violate this rule, since failing to
adhere to controlling case law is clearly incompetent.
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By requiring clearly established law to come only from the aforementioned
resources, courts would simply be requiring officers and their legal teams to pay
attention to the decisional law that would be controlling for their jurisdiction.
This approach best comports with fair notice as it would not be unfair to hold an
officer liable for violating constitutional rights of which he should have known
because the right in question had already been addressed by a controlling court
in his jurisdiction. Additionally, this incentivizes up-to-date legal training in the
jurisdiction that matters to the officers because cities could then be held liable
for their failure to properly train officers. The virtue of this approach is that it
incentivizes prevention rather than purely compensation.
Finally, this in no way impairs growing a continuing body of case law or
upsets legal norms. Persuasive authority from other jurisdictions may still be
used in § 1983 cases, as it should be. However, the rule I propose limits that
authority to only one portion of the qualified immunity analysis: whether a constitutional violation occurred. Courts should not be constrained to their own jurisdiction when developing constitutional law. Indeed, it is often valuable for
litigants and courts to look to persuasive authority when litigating first impression cases, for example.242 This proposal would not inhibit whatsoever a court’s
ability to develop constitutional law based, in part, on extra-jurisdictional authority.
But courts should be confined to their jurisdiction when looking at the
“clearly established law” prong. While finding a constitutional violation based
on extra-jurisdictional authority promotes constitutional development—and thus
prevention—finding a clearly established law violation instead seeks to shield
individual officers from liability based precisely on the lack of underdeveloped
constitutional law. In short, permitting the law to be “clearly established” based
on any relevant authority would simply duplicate the constitutional violation
analysis. This proposal refocuses the qualified immunity analysis in a way that
promotes constitutional law development yet protects officers when they must
make constitutionally violative decisions, the unconstitutionality of which they
could not have known beforehand.

One wrinkle in the analysis is resource level. Larger cities may have more resources that permit them to “farm” out liability or high-profile cases while smaller cities may be forced to
litigate these issues themselves. It is possible that while larger cities may farm out cases, both
the smaller and the larger cities may decide to train officers in-house, if any is done at all,
through their own legal staff. Regardless, all attorneys must comply with the model rules, and
they apply equally to an attorney’s training of officers as well as their defending of them.
Attorneys also have an obligation to disclose controlling, adverse case law to the judge.
MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(2) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020).
242
Michael F. Smith, Litigating Cases with Questions of First Impression, 81 DEF. COUNS. J.
101, 103 (2014) (“[C]ase law from other jurisdictions will provide insight into the public policy considerations that have guided other courts in reaching the position you are advocating
on behalf of your client.”).
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b. What Level of Factual Detail Should Be Required?
In addition to my proposal that Congress adopt qualified immunity via statute, Congress should also clarify what level of factual detail is required to clearly
establish the law. The Court’s current standard requires that “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” should receive immunity.243 Consequently, when courts determine clearly established law, appeals to
general rules and standards usually will not suffice.244 Rather, the “rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is ‘clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’ ”245 And while there does not
need to be a case “directly on point,” existing precedent does need to place the
constitutional question “beyond debate.”246 The Supreme Court therefore requires that existing precedent to be particularized with similar facts to the case
at hand and not defined at a “high level of generality.”247
Remarkably, the Supreme Court’s standard here actually comports very well
with the broader qualified immunity policy concerns, and the standard is likewise
clear. Courts generally must find some case with similar facts, and the controlling
principle from that case must be so well-defined that every officer would know
beforehand that his conduct would violate the law. Unique facts would therefore
militate in favor of granting officers qualified immunity.248
Such a standard comports well with qualified immunity’s policy of ensuring
fair notice. When officers are unaware of the law because of the unique circumstances presented to them, they lack “fair notice” that what they are doing could
potentially violate the law. This standard only prevents—or at least it should prevent—an officer from being liable for his or her misconduct when even judges
themselves cannot agree on whether the rule prohibits the misconduct or when
no case before has clearly addressed the exact issue that confronted the officer.
Thus, any uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the propriety of the officer’s actions should create some deference in favor of the officer, especially in light of
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that qualified immunity should “protect all
but the plainly incompetent.” Because the Supreme Court’s standard regarding
factual similarity is clear (especially when considered with deference towards

243

White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308
(2015)); City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
244
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018).
245
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
246
White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308).
247
Id. at 551–52 (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742).
248
Id. at 552 (“[The panel] recognized that ‘this case presents a unique set of facts and circumstances’ in light of White’s late arrival on the scene. This alone should have been an important indication to the majority that White’s conduct did not violate a ‘clearly established’
right.” (citations omitted)); Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776 (“Even a cursory glance at the facts
of Graham confirms just how different that case is from this one.”).
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the officer), and because it comports well with the underlying policy justifications, Congress should rubber-stamp this aspect of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
c.

Adopting an “Obvious” Exception

I additionally propose that Congress, in adopting qualified immunity by statute, should adopt an “obviousness” exception. One major justification for qualified immunity is to prevent officers from hesitating when deciding to enforce the
law.249 The reasoning is that perhaps by giving officers “breathing room” to make
quick decisions in hazy areas of law,250 officers will be encouraged to vigorously
execute the law.251
As a result, when courts review qualified immunity, they look to whether a
constitutional right had been violated, and, even if a right had been violated,
whether that right was clearly established at the time it was violated.252 Because
the first prong looks only to whether a violation occurred, it is the clearly established law prong that acts as a defense and gives officers breathing room. One
significant strategy for defendants to claim the law is not clearly established, thus
invoking qualified immunity’s protections, is to marshal unique facts—a strategy
the Supreme Court has endorsed.253 In essence, the more a defendant can focus
on the unique facts and nature of the case and distinguish it from past precedent,
the more likely a court will find the law has not been clearly established.254 This
defense strategy has taken on increasing importance as the Supreme Court has
constantly doubled-down on the notion that, when analyzing clearly established
law, the right in question should not be defined at such a high level of generality.255 And the Court has blasted the Ninth Circuit in the past for defining the
right so specifically and, in essence, failing to grant immunity based on the
unique facts presented.256
However, critics have complained that the Court’s clearly established jurisprudence makes it too easy for defendants to avoid liability based on nothing
249

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when
they perform their duties reasonably.”).
250
Sampson v. County of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2020) (Zouhary, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743).
251
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
252
White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).
253
See supra note 248.
254
See White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (“[The panel] recognized that ‘this case presents a unique set
of facts and circumstances’ in light of White’s late arrival on the scene. This alone should have
been an important indication to the majority that White’s conduct did not violate a ‘clearly
established’ right.” (citations omitted)).
255
Id. at 551–52.
256
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (“This Court has ‘repeatedly told courts—
and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.’ ” (quoting City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2015))).
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more than these unique facts.257 Such an argument is troubling if qualified immunity’s rationale is fair notice. When the defendant commits a constitutional
violation, and there is an obviousness to the misconduct, it does not make sense
to immunize the officer even where the facts at hand are unique and no case
before is sufficiently like it. Thus, officers should not be immunized for their
misconduct when they knew, or had reason to know, their conduct would be
wrongful.
Adopting such an obviousness exception may help preserve some of the doctrine’s legitimacy because it would not immunize officers in highly inflammatory
and perhaps high-profile situations. For example, the Supreme Court recently
denied certiorari in the Jessop case.258 This meant that the Ninth Circuit’s grant
of qualified immunity to the officers in that case would stand. In Jessop, the
Ninth Circuit granted qualified immunity to officers who essentially stole over
$200,000 while executing a search warrant.259 At least in a rough sense, the officers should have known this behavior was wrongful before committing the conduct.260 In this case, the obviousness rules may have helped to fairly impose liability on facts which the Court otherwise would not have, as evidenced by the
Court’s cert denial. The Supreme Court has already tacitly endorsed such an obviousness rule, though its exact parameters are uncertain.261 And the Tenth Circuit has also implemented a qualified immunity test that explicitly explores how
obvious the misconduct was when determining whether qualified immunity
should apply.262

257

Meera Jagannathan, ‘They Get a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card’: How Qualified Immunity
Protects Police and Other Government Officials from Civil Lawsuits, MARKETWATCH (June
29, 2020, 10:26 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/they-get-a-get-out-of-jail-freecard-why-law-enforcement-and-other-government-officials-are-protected-from-civil-lawsuits-2020-06-24 [https://perma.cc/4GLC-96JH].
258
Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied 206 L. Ed. 2d 956
(2020).
259
Id. at 939–40.
260
But see Matt Ford, To Protect and Serve, or Pilfer and Steal?, NEW REPUBLIC: THE
SOAPBOX (Apr. 17, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157342/supreme-court-policequalified-immunity [https://perma.cc/CK7Y-2S2W] (referring to the Jessop decision as “stunning” but acknowledging the Court of Appeals’ important distinction: that the officer should
have known morally theft was prohibited but not necessarily violative of the Fourth Amendment). While the Ninth Circuit court’s decision relies on a fine distinction, it does illustrate
one problem: Obvious to who? There may be circumstances where misconduct is obvious to
a judge but perhaps not obvious to an officer. For example, there may be unique situations that
an officer confronts that typically do not fall within the ambit of his training. However, these
situations may be well understood by judges in other contexts.
261
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (“For that reason, we have held that Garner
and Graham do not by themselves create clearly established law outside ‘an obvious
case.’ . . . This is not a case where it is obvious that there was a violation of clearly established
law . . . .” (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004))).
262
Then-Judge Gorsuch described the Tenth Circuit’s sliding scale approach as follows:
“[T]he more obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional principles,
the less specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish the violation.” Wilson
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In short, an obviousness exception may help re-center the focus of qualified
immunity on fair notice. But the fair notice policy is undermined when officers
receive immunity for obvious wrongs simply because no other case was factually
similar. This is because officers receive immunity when no immunity was intended—either under § 1983’s provisions or even under the Supreme Court’s fair
notice rationale. Adopting an obviousness exception may additionally reduce
some public controversy if it successfully reduces the immunization of officers
in highly inflammatory contexts. It additionally promotes § 1983’s goal of compensating victims when a government actor violates their constitutional rights.
At the same time, this deflection may help appease those who wish to abolish
qualified immunity outright and engage in meaningful reform discussions. In
short, adopting an obviousness exception helps strike a better balance between
§ 1983’s compensation goals and qualified immunity’s public policy goal of encouraging vigorous execution of the law.
d. Addressing Indemnity Waivers

One additional proposal that may strike the preferred balance between
§ 1983 liability and qualified immunity is for cities to voluntarily include in
their indemnity waivers a provision exempting the governing entity from indemnifying officers who violate the “obviousness” standard. The officer then
would be required to satisfy the entire judgment personally, and it would require the officer to repay any expenses the governing entity incurred defending the officer. Such a proposal does two things: (1) it comports with the plain
meaning of § 1983’s text and its purpose—requiring individuals to be responsible for civil judgments in their individual capacity—which indemnity waivers undermine,263 and (2) it puts the burden clearly on the individual officer,
which may prevent such egregious violations in the future or deter some from
joining the force in the first place.
Furthermore, officers should not receive the benefit of indemnity waivers—and maybe even qualified immunity—when their actions violate department policy.264 The city should not be required to pay for civil judgments
v. City of Lafayette, 510 F. App’x 775, 777 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Casey v. City of Fed.
Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007)).
263
See Schwartz, supra note 22. However, at least one scholar sees indemnity waivers as “less
prevalent” and consequently less important for ensuring police accountability than other
measures. See Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1221 (2017) (recognizing that a “significant number of contract require the municipality to indemnify officers”
but also noting that “[p]olice-reform advocates may argue that any of these provisions constitutes a significant limitation on officer accountability . . . [but they] seemed less prevalent than
[other] categories”).
264
Notably, the Ninth Circuit looks to police department training in determining whether officers have violated clearly established law, Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052,
1061–62 (2003), even though the Supreme Court has said that such materials should not affect
the analysis. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (“Nor does it
matter for purposes of qualified immunity that . . . the officers did not follow their
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against an officer when the officer violates the city department’s policy in the
first place, especially when the city has done its due diligence in training the
officer. Of course, if the city has not appropriately trained the officers, other
causes of action exist that may provide compensation.265 Permitting indemnification for officers when they violate departmental policies only hurts taxpayers because, ultimately, taxpayers must bear an indemnified officer’s
costs. Such a policy does not make sense when the municipality has fully
complied with its obligation to properly supervise and train officers. Because
department policies are closer to the officer’s mind and action, it would not
be unfair to hold them liable when they violate those policies.
C. The Sequencing Problem
The third problem with qualified immunity is that, in its current state, it does
prevent creating a continuous body of constitutional law. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court established the Saucier analysis.266 The Saucier analysis created a rigid two-part mandatory sequencing.267 First, in assessing qualified immunity, a court must establish whether a constitutional violation
occurred.268 If no violation occurred, the inquiry ends as qualified immunity itself
is not needed.269 Only after a violation has occurred would a court then identify
whether the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the
time it was violated.270 The Court then announced its reasoning and policy justification for a required sequencing: “The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly
established . . . .”271
However, the Court has since reversed course (again)272 and no longer requires the strict Saucier sequencing.273 Though permitting courts to use that sequencing if they so choose, the Supreme Court primarily did away with the sequencing on judicial conservation of resources grounds.274 The effect of
eliminating Saucier sequencing is problematic for many reasons. First, it puts the

training. . . . Even if an officer acts contrary to her training, however . . . that does not itself
negate qualified immunity . . . .”).
265
See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
266
Saucier v Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
267
Id. at 201.
268
Id.
269
E.g., id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Karen M. Blum, The Qualified Immunity Defense: What’s “Clearly Established” and
What’s Not, 24 TOURO L. REV. 501, 507 (2008) (eerily predicting that though mandatory sequencing was then required, it would “likely change in the not-too-distant future”).
273
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
274
Id.
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courts in “permanent limbo.”275 In other words, because courts can refrain from
deciding difficult constitutional questions when there is another way (in this case,
deciding if the law was “clearly established”), courts can continually avoid constitutional issues, effectively preventing the law from fully developing on any
issue.276 And available studies show that the Court’s departure from the rigid
two-step Saucier approach has led to some constitutional stagnation, even if limited.277 For example, the appellate courts were much more likely to find a constitutional violation under Saucier’s mandatory two-step sequencing than under the
non-mandatory sequencing courts use now to analyze qualified immunity.278
Thus, constitutional stagnation is not some sort of theoretical boogeyman—
it is very real with very real consequences. A more recent study substantiated
these claims, showing that since Pearson v. Callahan, courts have increasingly
bypassed the constitutional violation analysis and skipped to the clearly established law prong.279 In effect, this means officers may continue to allegedly violate constitutional rights and receive immunity for it because not one of the prior
courts who first heard the matter took the time to decide if the officer violated
constitutional rights.280 Furthermore, a comparison between Saucier qualified
immunity cases and Pearson qualified immunity cases shows that in the Pearson
non-mandatory sequencing era, officers receive immunity far more than they did
under Saucier.281 It is possible that this significant change stems from the courts’
failures to “clearly establish” Fourth Amendment law by not deciding the constitutional violation prong. Had a court clearly established the law, one victim—
rather than two, three, or maybe even four—would have been the only one denied
compensation for an officer’s bad behavior.
In addition to leaving constitutional law less developed, “[d]eterrence is diminished . . . and the individual and societal interest in the vindication of rights
is sacrificed.”282 When qualified immunity prevents a constitutional body of law
275

Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Joshua Matz, Avoiding Permanent Limbo: Qualified Immunity
and the Elaboration of Constitutional Rights from Saucier to Camreta (and Beyond), 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 643, 643 (2011).
276
See id. at 651.
277
Nielson & Walker, supra note 200. The authors’ findings are mixed: Post-Pearson, courts
do not avoid taking up new constitutional issues, but the rate at which they find constitutional
violations post-Pearson has decreased, leading to some stagnation. Id. at 37–38.
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Id.
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Andrew Chung et al., For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS:
INVESTIGATES (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus [https://perma.cc/RN66-VJ7L] (finding that at least three
dozen cases have been handed down without going through the full two-step process). Pearson
is the seminal case in which Justice Alito announced that the Court would no longer require
the Saucier two-step sequencing.
280
Id. (“In effect, the same conduct can repeatedly go unpunished.”).
281
Id. (showing that the percentage of plaintiffs winning dropped from 57 percent to 43 percent).
282
Rudovsky, supra note 55, at 55. It is interesting that Rudovsky considered this implication
well before mandatory sequencing was required. However, as mandatory sequencing has been
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from being fully developed, law enforcement officers will continue to act in potentially unlawful ways because courts “dodge” the difficult constitutional issues. That leaves a salient question: Can a ruling that a right was not clearly
established serve to “clearly establish” law in the future? Perhaps not, as this
does not give an officer “fair notice” that any constitutional right could be violated since the Court never ruled on whether a constitutional violation occurred
at all.283 Only when the court at issue rules on the constitutional question should
an officer have “fair notice,” though some courts have cleverly disguised the issue.284
In short, the Court’s usual policy of constitutional avoidance is not wellsuited for qualified immunity cases.285 Additionally, the Court’s espoused justification of judicial conservation of resources286 fails because qualified immunity
requires that courts evaluate the contours of a constitutional right to determine if
clearly established law exists.287 In other words, the Court saves no resources in
skipping to the second part of the question when the second part of the question
requires the court to at least evaluate the most important and time-consuming
aspect of the first part of the question.
Finally, one other problem with Pearson’s elimination of the Saucier approach merits some attention. Giving courts discretion on whether to declare a
constitutional violation or not gives different circuits more or less of a voice
when it comes to establishing a constitutional right.288 For example, the Ninth
Circuit, when deciding to exercise discretion, creates rights—or rather finds violations of previously unknown rights—at twice the national rate of the other
circuits.289 The implication of this is that—at least between circuits—individuals

“undone,” it is fitting that the concerns of a pre-Saucier time should come back to haunt the
Court.
283
See Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 590 (9th Cir. 2018) (“In the face of the then-current
law, there was not a clearly established constitutional violation. Going forward, however, the
law is clearly established in this scenario.”).
284
See id. at 588, 590. Additionally, even when courts may not “dodge” the constitutional
violation question entirely, there may be some danger they will nonetheless “finesse” or
shortchange the analysis because the clearly established law prong provides such a strong defense. See Rudovsky, supra note 55, at 56.
285
Kirkpatrick & Matz, supra note 275, at 651; see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692,
705–07 (2011) (discussing the problems with the Court’s constitutional avoidance policy on
qualified immunity claims).
286
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009).
287
Kirkpatrick & Matz, supra note 275, at 651; see also Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified
Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 485 (2011) (“Often the question of what law is
‘clearly established’ is determined by deciding the scope of the right the plaintiff asserts.”).
288
Nielson & Walker, supra note 200, at 40–41.
289
Id. at 41. However, the Supreme Court has consistently chided the Ninth Circuit for finding
constitutional violations by taking too general of an approach to the factual inquiry required.
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (“This Court has ‘repeatedly told courts—and
the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.’ ” (quoting City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2015))). This
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living within the Ninth Circuit are much more likely to receive compensation
than the other circuits, which leads to the problem we previously addressed: lack
of uniformity.290 It also means that the officers within the Ninth Circuit have a
faster moving body of law to govern them.
1. The Sequencing Fix
As part of a congressional reform package, I would recommend reintroducing the Saucier analysis. Requiring the courts to first look to see whether a constitutional violation occurred is beneficial for two reasons: (1) it actually helps
preserve the judicial conservation of resources argument in some cases because
if no violation occurred, then the court does not need to go any further; and (2)
it best provides officers “fair notice” because the existing constitutional law will
be more clear, and they will consequently have more guidance in enforcing the
law. While the right at stake will be clearly established, the only remaining difficult question for the court is “caging in” the specific facts of the case to see
whether those facts fall within a previously declared right.
Additionally, the congressional reform package will create greater uniformity between circuits as well as within them. Because the current law permits
intra-circuit judges discretion to apply the sequencing or not, some intra-circuit
judges will, and others will not.291 For example, Republican judges are much
more likely to decide the law was not clearly established rather than seek to find
a constitutional violation in the first place.292 This problem is more clear in the
Ninth Circuit because the Ninth Circuit has more judges and thus more combinations of panels to draw from, which—depending on the “luck of the draw”—
could determine whether a right is violated in the first place or whether it just
was not clearly established.293 This often holds true when Ninth Circuit cases are
heard en banc because the Ninth Circuit will not have all twenty-plus judges hear
the case. This unfairly applies the law to similarly situated victims and deprives
plaintiffs and defendants the full gambit of procedural protections given to others. Currently, the courts have little guidance intra-circuit on when to “avoid” the
constitutional problem,294 so clear guidance from Congress will make that determination simple.

shows the Supreme Court often locks horns with the Ninth Circuit on their qualified immunity
jurisprudence.
290
Nielson & Walker, supra note 200, at 42.
291
Id. at 42–46.
292
Id. at 45–46.
293
Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the “Mini-Supreme Court”, 13
J.L. & POL. 377, 388–89 (1997) (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s large size forced them to
hold “mini” en banc proceedings).
294
See Kirkpatrick and Matz, supra note 275, at 655–56. Justice Kagan eloquently describes
the uncomfortable tension in qualified immunity cases with the Court’s policy on avoiding
far-reaching constitutional questions in Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705–07 (2011).
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D. The Execution Problem
The fourth problem, and perhaps most controversial, is that qualified immunity in practice undermines qualified immunity’s purpose. As an affirmative
defense, qualified immunity can be raised at any stage of the litigation, even the
motion to dismiss stage.295 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly (and perhaps
more consistently than any other facet of qualified immunity) emphasized that
qualified immunity should be asserted as early as possible.296 The whole point of
qualified immunity is to provide officers with “immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability”297 and to ensure “insubstantial claims” are weeded out
before official discovery even begins.298
Because motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions require factspecific inquiries, courts find it difficult to actually grant qualified immunity at
the pleading stage.299 One reason for this is the procedural posture: motions to
dismiss require liberal constructions, and motions for summary judgment require
a slant in favor of the nonmovant party.300 This no doubt partially accounts for
Joanna Schwartz’s findings that in a two-year period, when defendants raised
qualified immunity, only 0.6 percent of those cases were dismissed at the motion
to dismiss stage, and only 2.6 percent were dismissed at the summary judgment
stage.301 This study suggests that qualified immunity fails to accomplish one of
its major goals: dispensing with litigation early and providing immunity even
from suit, not just liability.302
For a Court so concerned about protecting government officials from the
burdens of litigation,303 these numbers are concerning. The numbers get increasingly concerning as there has been a steady rise of litigation under § 1983, putting qualified immunity front and center in an increasing number of cases.304
Consequently, qualified immunity remains all the more relevant as more and
more state and local governments must somehow dispose of and answer the numerous § 1983 claims against its officers. Thus, ensuring qualified immunity actually serves its intended purpose has become far more important. After all, what
good is a defense that does not serve its intended purpose? The Supreme Court’s
295

Reinert, supra note 287, at 487.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
227 (1991)).
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Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); see also Coates, supra note 134, at 12.
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Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 n.2 (1987).
299
See Coates, supra note 134, at 11; see also Blum, supra note 272, at 508 n.34 (citing Hydrick v. Hunter 449 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006)) (“[A] motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds puts the court in the difficult position of deciding far-reaching constitutional
questions on a non-existent factual record.”); Leon Friedman, Qualified Immunity When Facts
Are in Dispute, 16 TOURO L. REV. 857, 864 (2000).
300
Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005).
301
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 2.
302
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–27.
303
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 14.
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Id. at 27 tbl.1.
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consistent policy justification for enforcing qualified immunity has been to shield
government officials from litigation as early as possible, so the officials can vigorously execute the law without backseat driving.305
We have the competing concerns of private individuals whose constitutional
rights have been potentially violated, however. Granting these victims justice—
and compensation—as early as possible is also desirable. The legal procedural
framework used as a vehicle for vindicating those rights currently requires not
automatically dismissing claims without any factual record.306 In other words,
tensions arise because through § 1983, Congress requires complete vindication
while the Supreme Court requires early dismissal.307 These competing concerns
require that one side must give ground in every qualified immunity case. Which
side wins, then, likely results from the individual judges and their theories of how
to resolve this sticky dilemma,308 as there is little guidance from the Supreme
Court.
1. The Execution Fix
So far, the “adjustments” I have proposed to qualified immunity have been
straightforward in their application and require little more than clarifying existing law. Additionally, these changes do not require much in the way of judicial
resources nor do they substantively alter how practitioners litigate qualified immunity. But ensuring that qualified immunity serves its intended purposes requires more than just mere legal changes. While the legal clarifications make the
doctrine better, simpler, and more legitimate, they do nothing to resolve the inherent paradox between an affirmative defense to litigation and a procedural
framework that requires permissive readings for fact-intensive scenarios. If the
only thing standing in the way of satisfying the competing claims is the procedural framework, the smart move is to amend that procedural framework.
Qualified immunity is important at three stages: the pleading stage, pre-trial
motion stage, and the trial stage. However, this paper focuses only on a congressional fix to the pleading requirements for qualified immunity. In the following,
I provide three suggestions regarding how to establish a pleading requirement
and enforcement mechanism that support the purpose and benefits of qualified
immunity.

305

See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
306
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 238–39 (2009) (expressing that deciding qualified
immunity at the pleading stage can be difficult when the factual record from the pleadings is
underdeveloped).
307
Compare Rudovsky, supra note 55 (describing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “admits of no immunities” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976))), with Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (recognizing that the qualified immunity decision should be made early
in the litigation process).
308
See Nielsen & Walker, supra note 200, at 43–46.
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First, I propose that Congress require a § 1983 plaintiff plead with particularity the facts which, when taken as true, show the officer violated a constitutional right. This mirrors the typical pleading requirements for alleging fraud.309
Imposing a heightened pleading standard under a § 1983 allegation makes sense
because it reinforces some of the concerns against suing a polity of which the
litigant is a part. For one, a heightened pleading standard may disincentivize frivolous allegations and immature pleadings (when complainant prematurely alleges a cause of action without much of the factual story)310 and provides officers
early and fair notice of the precise conduct alleged to be unconstitutional.
While some may recoil at requiring a heightened pleading standard for factual allegations on civil claims because it may weed out more potential litigants,
it is important to remember that this standard will not substantially impair complainants with good facts. Complainants will still enjoy the presumption that all
well-pleaded facts are taken as true in defeating a motion to dismiss.311 Additionally, even when complainants may struggle to allege a “particular” story because
they failed to initiate a lawsuit when the memory or action was fresh, they always
have recourse to informal discovery.
Normally, informal discovery may be difficult when dealing with two private parties because the actions may often be of private concern, or there may
just be little available informal evidence. However, because § 1983 always involves a state actor, much informal discovery (or, perhaps, pre-discovery) is
available for potential litigants. Both local and national laws require the public
have some access to public records, and this can often include body cam footage,
incident reports, and perhaps officer-specific information.312
Consequently, litigants seeking to impose liability on state actors have a
wealth of publicly available pre-discovery documents which can assist them in
“pleading with particularity” within the statute of limitations without requiring
officer depositions. This informal discovery permits potential litigants to access
a wealth of information that will help them clear a heightened pleading hurdle
without subjecting the officer to the costs of litigation. And all too often, in an
age of constant videoing of police actions, widely available videos can help a
309

See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 98–99 (2007). But see generally Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011) (discussing how heightened pleading standards may not actually do what advocates claim).
311
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
312
See generally Chris Pagliarella, Police Body-Worn Camera Footage: A Question of Access, 34 YALE L. POL’Y REV. 533 (2016) (discussing the Freedom of Information Act and how
different states have taken different approaches in considering body cam footage as a public
record and the difficult choices municipalities must make in determining whether to disclose
such a record). Additionally, informal discovery tools—like bystander video recordings—may
receive additional protections via the First Amendment, see generally Tyler Finn, Note, Qualified Immunity Formalism: “Clearly Established Law” and the Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445 (2019), and these protections may encourage or lead to additional
informal discovery.
310
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potential litigant clear that heightened pleading hurdle, especially as governments enact protections for videoing officer interactions.313
Second, I propose that Congress require the complainant anticipate the officer will invoke qualified immunity and plead past it. Thus, in addition to pleading a particular factual story that shows the officer violated a constitutional right,
I propose the complainant must also, in their complaint, pinpoint the exact case
law that they allege should have put the officer on fair notice that the officer
violated the complainant’s constitutional rights. To be clear, the complainant still
enjoys a presumption that well-pleaded particular facts are true.314 At this stage,
then, the complainant may use those facts to particularly describe how the specific case law put the officer on fair notice that his specific conduct constituted a
constitutional violation. In other words, the plaintiff must show through existing
case law that the officer should have known better.
In reviewing this under a motion to dismiss, I propose courts need not be
rigid: a “close enough” standard may suffice to survive a motion to dismiss. Under this new standard at the motion to dismiss stage, courts would be encouraged
to focus on the clearly established law prong of the analysis. All a reviewing
court needs to do would be to ask: Taking the complainants facts as true, would
the case law proposed likely have let the officer know beforehand that his conduct
was unconstitutional?315 If so, the case may proceed; if not, it must be dismissed.
Once again, there would be no change to other procedural mechanisms, so even
if a plaintiff failed the first time, they could still get another chance to properly
plead their case.
One specific virtue that animates this proposed fix is the ability to simplify
the standard and make it more meaningful. Currently, for qualified immunity to
attach, the defendant must raise it in their complaint and essentially “prove the
negative” because they must attempt to show that clearly established law did not
exist to put them on notice.316 If they cannot show the lack of case law in their
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See Catherine Kim, Viral Videos of Police Violence Are Leading to Disciplinary Action,
VOX (June 6, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/6/21282412/protests-viral-videospolice-violence-disciplinary-action-suspension-firing [https://perma.cc/H6MX-6NKD]; see
also Frank Rudy Cooper et al., Nevada Criminal Justice Reform Bills Falls Far Short, NEV.
INDEP. (Aug. 1, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/nevada-criminaljustice-reform-bill-falls-far-short [https://perma.cc/S4WJ-DAVF] (discussing a Nevada bill
on criminal justice reform that would offer protections to those who record police brutality).
314
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).
315
This “likely” standard at the motion to dismiss stage resembles one of the factors used in
evaluating whether a preliminary injunction should be issued. See, e.g., Rubin ex rel. N.L.R.B.
v. Vista Del Sol Health Servs., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing
how a preliminary injunction requires a threshold showing of “a likelihood of success on the
merits”).
316
As an affirmative defense, the burden rests on the government officials to plead and prove
qualified immunity, including the proposition that clearly established law did not control their
actions. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). Of a necessity, this requires the
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responsive pleading, the motion will be denied and defendants lose the virtue of
a defense meant to shield them at the earliest stages of litigation.317 Thus, government attorneys must sift through all potentially available case law to make
their case. The burden of that exhausting research falls on government attorneys
who must shift that monetary burden on taxpayers. But by placing the burden on
the plaintiff, we would save the government from expending significant resources and restrict them to only distinguishing the complainant’s proposed case
law from the complainant’s proposed facts. Additionally, it makes sense to put
the initial burden on the plaintiff since they have the greatest incentive, those
cases are contingency-based, and it is difficult to prove the negative.318 This ensures state actors are not treated as presumptively guilty at the pleading stages.
Third, I propose that Congress permit, as an implementation option, allowing courts to choose to utilize screeners to first review § 1983 complaints to see
if the complaints meet the baseline requirements. This option already exists for
pro se litigants within prison under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.319 These
screeners could look to see whether procedural requirements have been met and
the likelihood that a court will find it meets the necessary requirements. These
screeners could act as a “buffer” in § 1983 litigation between the litigant and the
officers when the litigant has failed to present a claim “within the ballpark” of
stating a valid cause of action. This reinforces judicial economy since these
screeners can become “experts” in this area and because only a finite amount of
clearly established law can exist in an area of law. Screeners also reinforce qualified immunity’s main goal—protecting officers from insubstantial litigation—
because the screeners act as an additional buffer or shield between a potential
litigant and the officer.
At the outset, these revised pleading requirements impose a higher standard
on complainants than those imposed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.320
And understandably, many activists may question whether these pleading
officers to prove the lack of something; in this case, it is the lack of case law governing their
actions.
317
See Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2017) (reiterating that the policy
behind qualified immunity is to dispense with litigation as early as possible if qualified immunity applies).
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See, e.g., Harris v. Libke, No. 2014-CA-001029-MR, 2016 WL 3752119, at *12–*13 (Ky.
Ct. App. July 8, 2016) (“Generally, courts do not expect a party to prove the negative of an
issue.”). But see generally Elinor R. Jordan, Is Qualified Immunity an Affirmative Defense in
Name Alone? Why Courts Should Shift Away from Placing the Burden to Refute Qualified
Immunity on § 1983 Plaintiffs, 69 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 160 (2012) (discussing how most
federal circuits inappropriately place the burden of pleading past an affirmative defense on
plaintiffs).
319
See Schlanger, supra note 27, at 1669 n.361 (discussing judicial pre-screening as an optional mechanism that courts have created and the Prison Litigation Reform Act encourages).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, to some degree, similarly operates as a procedural “fix”
because it is aimed at reducing frivolous litigation—a goal it has made good strides in achieving. Id. at 1559–60.
320
See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 1, 8(b).
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requirements also violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its purpose.321 After all, on its
face, § 1983 “admits of no immunities.”322 It is a fair criticism. Undoubtedly,
many more potential litigants may be screened out at the initial pleading stage
than would otherwise be under current practice.323 However, a few principles
militate against the conclusion that discouraging potential litigants necessarily
impedes civil rights litigation.
For one, a goal of the pleading standard mechanism is to balance the need
for judicial economy (screen out improper litigants) and the desire to encourage
victims to pursue legal remedies.324 While our earlier legal history loosely enforced a very permissive pleading standard,325 the modern landscape has shifted
to a more stringent pleading standard.326 Here, this standard, while imposing a
heightened pleading requirement for specific cases, reflects the value that we
should permit only potentially successful litigants to substantially expend judicial resources on legal matters. Thus, in discouraging frivolous or likely unsuccessful litigation earlier in the process, the standard preserves judicial economy
and brings pleading practices in harmony with the Supreme Court’s espoused
purpose for the doctrine: shielding officers from disabling litigation.327
Next, some critics may argue this will cast a wider net in that it may discourage potentially successful litigants from pursuing a claim because it poses a
greater degree of difficulty. However, this argument should not carry the day.
While, as mentioned, this imposes a higher obstacle for all litigants, not just
likely unsuccessful litigants, the additional burden is minimal. Indeed, this may
even save some litigants time, since, in stating their claim and pointing to applicable case law, it narrows the field from which to argue. Because qualified immunity remains fact-intensive and the Supreme Court requires a high degree of
specificity,328 litigants will only have a limited number of cases from which to
argue their case in the complaint. A successful pleading showing qualified immunity may apply may very well discourage state actors from relying on qualified immunity in those cases and instead focus their claim on whether a violation
occurred in the first place.
321

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Rudovsky, supra note 55.
323
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This leads to another desirable outcome and one already addressed earlier as
a “fix” for qualified immunity.329 In encouraging and forcing litigants to focus
their inquiries on whether a constitutional violation occurred, constitutional case
law in the area will continually develop. This achieves the desirable outcome of
providing a comprehensive body of law that will then serve to put other officers
in the future on “fair notice” that their actions could violate constitutional rights.
More than encouraging litigants, a successful pleading mechanism should, where
possible, prioritize and incentivize prevention rather than mere compensation.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this mechanism really does not alter
how the law should be operating anyway. As mentioned, the first part of the
pleading standard does not change existing law or pleading practice. Additionally, while the “likely” standard and requiring plaintiffs to plead past qualified
immunity are new, plaintiffs are still protected through current motion practice.
Plaintiffs get to tell the story with their facts, and those facts cannot be disputed;
motions to dismiss are therefore generally inappropriate on factually disputed
constitutional violation questions.330 This fix just re-emphasizes that courts must
still look at the clearly established law prong on a motion to dismiss, and this
analysis should not be shortchanged based on any factual disputes, since the facts
must be plaintiffs’ facts.331 True, requiring a complainant to anticipate and plead
the non-existence of an affirmative defense is new, but, as discussed, this newness solely serves to promote the Supreme Court’s goals without adding much
of an additional burden.
Finally, Congress may choose to implement this via amending the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and creating special institutionalized pleading requirements for qualified immunity cases. Or Congress may so choose to implement
via a separate statute. Regardless, the outcome would remain the same.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, qualified immunity poses an interesting dilemma where a past
Congress has required vindication, but the Supreme Court, in interpreting the
defense, requires early dismissals. However, this inherent controversy need not
be so stark. The qualified immunity doctrine remains in disarray because Congress refuses to provide clarification on the scope of a statute it has passed. Congress can strike the right balance between those competing interests through
amending its pleading mechanism and standards. In doing so, Congress will give
qualified immunity renewed legitimacy and best vindicate litigants’ rights, while
also protecting our public officials from frivolous litigation.
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